Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 42
Number 2 Prison Privatization: Impacts on Urban
Communities

Article 3

April 2016

Has All Heck Broken Loose? Examining Heck's
Favorable-Termination Requirement in the Second
Circuit After Poventud v. City of New York
John P. Collins
Fordham University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Law and
Politics Commons, Law and Race Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons
Recommended Citation
John P. Collins, Has All Heck Broken Loose? Examining Heck's Favorable-Termination Requirement in the Second Circuit After Poventud v.
City of New York, 42 Fordham Urb. L.J. 451 (2014).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol42/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

HAS ALL HECK BROKEN LOOSE?
EXAMINING HECK’S FAVORABLETERMINATION REQUIREMENT IN THE
SECOND CIRCUIT AFTER POVENTUD V.

CITY OF NEW YORK
John P. Collins*
Introduction .............................................................................................452
I. Background: The Statutory Framework and Supreme Court
Jurisprudence ....................................................................................455
A. Section 1983 and Habeas......................................................456
1. Section 1983 .....................................................................456
2. Habeas ..............................................................................457
3. Collisions at the Intersection .........................................457
B. Heck and Spencer .................................................................458
1. Heck v. Humphrey ..........................................................458
2. Spencer v. Kemna............................................................461
II. The Circuit Split Over Custody and Heck’s FavorableTermination Requirement ...............................................................463
A. Circuit Courts Finding that Custody Is Irrelevant
Under Heck’s Binding Precedent .......................................464
1. The First Circuit ..............................................................464
2. The Fifth Circuit ..............................................................465
3. The Third Circuit.............................................................466
4. The Eighth Circuit...........................................................467
B. Circuit Courts Finding that the Spencer “Majority”
Permits Exceptions to the Heck Bar in Limited
Circumstances ........................................................................469

*

J.D., cum laude, May 2013, Fordham University School of Law. Associate, Sullivan
& Cromwell LLP, Sept. 2014–Present; Law Clerk, United States District Court,
Southern District of New York, Sept. 2013–Aug. 2014. I would like to thank the
following people for their help in writing this article: my family for their guidance and
insight; Professor Mike Martin and my co-clerk Anika Rappleye for their thoughtful
feedback and edits; and Lindsey for her encouragement, support, and service as an
invaluable sounding board.

451

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

452

[Vol. XLII

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

The Eleventh Circuit.......................................................469
The Ninth Circuit ............................................................470
The Sixth Circuit .............................................................473
The Fourth Circuit ..........................................................474
The Tenth Circuit ............................................................475
The Seventh Circuit ........................................................476
C. Heck in the Second Circuit ..................................................477
1. Jenkins v. Haubert ..........................................................478
2. Leather v. Eyck................................................................479
3. Green v. Montgomery.....................................................480
4. Huang ex rel. Yu v. Johnson ..........................................481
III. Poventud v. City of New York .......................................................481
A. Background ............................................................................481
B. Poventud I—The District Court ..........................................483
C. Poventud II—Exception to the Heck Bar Broadly
Construed ...............................................................................484
D. Poventud III—Vacatur and Narrower Ground .................486
1. The Majority Opinion .....................................................487
2. Judge Jacobs’ Principal Dissent .....................................487
IV. The Poventud II Panel Decision Incorrectly Expanded the
Limited Exceptions Previously Recognized by the Second
Circuit .................................................................................................489
A. These Narrow Interpretations Accord with Heck ............490
B. Jenkins, Leather, and Green Did not Create an
Absolute Right to File Suit Under Section 1983 ...............492
C. Even Though Huang Expands Upon the Limited
Exceptions in Jenkins, Leather, and Green, it Does
not Permit Section 1983 Suits Whenever Habeas
Relief Is Unavailable ............................................................496
D. Lower Courts Should Apply the Second Circuit’s
Heck Precedent Narrowly Going Forward ........................499
Conclusion ................................................................................................501

INTRODUCTION
Imagine yourself in the shoes of Marcos Poventud. You have spent
the last nine years in prison because of a conviction tainted by the
police department’s failure to turn over potentially exculpatory
evidence.1 During those nine years, you were abused, physically and

1. Poventud v. City of New York, 715 F.3d 57, 58–59 (2d Cir. 2013), vacated en
banc on other grounds, 750 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2014) [hereinafter Poventud II].
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mentally.2
Now, although your conviction was vacated, the
prosecution successfully argued that you should remain incarcerated
pending your new trial.3 The prosecution is also appealing the
vacatur, and who knows when or how the appeals process will end.4
Remaining in prison for the foreseeable future seems inevitable. But,
you see a light at the end of the tunnel. The prosecution has offered
you a plea.5 Agreeing to it will require that you admit to being
involved in the armed robbery, a crime against which you asserted
your innocence at trial, but it will also secure your immediate release.6
The choice before you seems simple, right?
Surely this is what Marcos Poventud was thinking when he
accepted the prosecution’s plea offer. What likely had not crossed his
mind, however, was the impact of the plea on his ability to seek
damages for a violation of his constitutional rights under Brady v.
Maryland.7 At its core, the problem with Poventud’s suit for damages
arose from the oft-debated intersection of the two most common
sources of federal prisoners’ rights litigation, habeas corpus and
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (§ 1983).8 Supreme Court precedent prevents a
party from asserting a § 1983 claim when success on that claim
necessarily implies the invalidity of an outstanding conviction.9 That
type of challenge is more properly considered a collateral attack
traditionally reserved for a habeas corpus petition. In Heck v.
Humphrey10 and Spencer v. Kemna,11 the Supreme Court grappled
with this overlap, but concurrences and dicta-parsing split the lower
courts as to whether Heck always required the current or former
prisoner to show a favorable-termination when seeking damages
under § 1983, or whether courts could recognize exceptions to Heck’s
rule in certain circumstances that were not explicitly considered by

2. See id. at 59.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (requiring that the prosecution disclose material
exculpatory evidence to the defense).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). During the period from March 2012 to March 2013,
19,235 habeas petitions and 17,057 prisoner civil rights actions were filed. See Cases
Commenced, by Basis of Jurisdiction and Nature of Suit, U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloa
dStatistics/2013/tables/C02Mar13.pdf.
9. See generally Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
10. Id.
11. 523 U.S. 1 (1998).
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the Court.12 Poventud had secured a vacatur of one conviction, only
to subsequently plead guilty to the same facts and circumstances,
albeit to a lesser-charged offense. He was no longer in custody, so
habeas relief was no longer available. Did his desire to achieve
freedom from a corrupted conviction cost him his opportunity to
receive damages for a constitutional violation?
This was the question before the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit. The facts, circumstances, and questions of law
are nothing short of rare and exceptional; indeed, they are
reminiscent of those often found in first-year law school exams. But
the real-world implications concern an issue of profound importance:
the right to redress for a constitutional violation. Despite the obvious
significance of this issue, the circuit courts are split on whether there
are any exceptions to Heck’s seemingly absolute favorabletermination requirement. Initially, a sharply divided three-judge
panel recognized the most expansive exception to Heck to date: an
absolute right to file suit under § 1983 if a person is no longer in
custody and therefore has no remedy in habeas.13 This decision
launched a rehearing en banc, a procedure in the Second Circuit that
is as rare and exceptional as the case itself.14 Ultimately, the en banc
court decided the case on a narrower ground, finding that Marcos
Poventud’s § 1983 suit did not, in fact, imply the invalidity of his
conviction by guilty plea, thus removing the case from Heck’s
purview.15 But the court never reached the soundness of the original
panel’s analysis of Second Circuit case law.16 It remains unclear in the
Second Circuit whether a plaintiff’s custodial status affects his ability
to seek damages for constitutional violations and, if so, to what
extent.

12. See discussion infra Parts I.B, II.A–B.
13. Poventud II, 715 F.3d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 2013), vacated en banc on other grounds,
750 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2014).
14. It is the “longstanding tradition” of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit to defer generally to panel decisions, proceeding to a full
rehearing en banc “only in rare and exceptional circumstances.” See Ricci v.
DeStefano, 530 F.3d 88, 89–90 (2d Cir. 2008) (Katzmann, J., concurring in denial of
rehearing en banc). This tradition is rooted in the belief that “[d]ifficult issues should
be decided only when they must be decided,” and further consideration is best left to
the auspices of the Supreme Court. Id. at 89 (Calabresi, J., concurring in denial of
rehearing en banc); see also id. at 93 (Jacobs, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc).
15. Poventud v. City of New York, 750 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2014) [hereinafter
Poventud III].
16. See id. at 125 n.1.
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Part I of this Article reviews the historical scope and function of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in prisoners’ civil rights litigation.
Part I additionally describes the manner in which the Supreme Court
in Heck and Spencer refined that relationship to alleviate issues of
potentially overlapping jurisdiction. Part II explores the split
between those circuits holding that Heck’s bar applies if success on a
§ 1983 claim for civil damages would necessarily imply the invalidity
of an outstanding conviction regardless of whether the claimant is still
in custody, and those that have circumscribed Heck’s holding in favor
of Justice Souter’s narrower view in Spencer.17 Part II further
examines the Heck bar as applied in the Second Circuit prior to
Poventud. Part III analyzes the Second Circuit’s most recent
application of Heck in both the original panel and subsequent en banc
decisions in Poventud.18 Part IV considers the state of § 1983, Heck,
and custody in the Second Circuit in the aftermath of Poventud.
Bringing this analysis to bear on Poventud II’s holding reveals that
the decision was an incorrect application of already flawed circuit law.
However, this Part proposes that post-Heck Second Circuit case law
can be read to permit limited exceptions to the favorable-termination
requirement without running afoul of Heck’s core concerns.
I. BACKGROUND: THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AND SUPREME
COURT JURISPRUDENCE
Before one can understand the Supreme Court’s attempt to avoid
collisions at “the intersection of the two most fertile sources of
federal-court prisoner litigation,”19 it is critical to examine both
statutes and the intended function and scope of each. Following a
brief discussion of § 1983 and habeas, this Part discusses the Supreme
Court’s holdings in Heck and Spencer, paying particular attention to
the interplay between the majority in Heck and Justice Souter’s
concurring opinion in Spencer.

17. The First, Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits have held that Heck imposes an
absolute bar on § 1983 claims seeking civil damages where success on that claim
would necessarily impugn a conviction for which the claimant has not already secured
a favorable termination. See infra Part II.A. By contrast, the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh,
Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have permitted such actions in limited
circumstances when the claimant is no longer in custody and therefore has no
recourse in habeas. See infra Part II.B. As discussed in Part II.C, infra, the Second
Circuit’s position is unclear.
18. Poventud II, 715 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 2013), vacated en banc on other grounds;
Poventud III, 750 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2014).
19. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 480 (1994) (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and 28 U.S.C. § 2254).
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A. Section 1983 and Habeas

1.

Section 1983

The Civil Rights Act of 1871, commonly referred to as the Ku Klux
Klan Act, codifed at 42 U.S.C. § 1983, created a cause of action
against those who, acting under color of state law, deprived citizens of
their rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.20 It
reads in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress . . . .21

The Reconstruction-era statute’s “historical catalyst” was the
widespread “campaign of violence and deception in the South,
fomented by the Ku Klux Klan, which was denying decent citizens
their civil and political rights.”22 To that end, § 1983’s purpose was
“to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as
guardians of the people’s federal rights.”23
To ensure those
disenfranchised by the States could seek redress, Congress broadly
“thr[ew] open the doors of the United States courts to individuals
who . . . had suffered[] the deprivation of constitutional rights.”24
Although § 1983 evinces Congress’s intent to provide broad access
to federal courts to those seeking recompense for constitutional
violations, such access is not exclusive; rather, it is entrusted
concurrently with state courts.25 That is, while a suit alleging
constitutional violations may be brought in state court, exhaustion of
state remedies is not a prerequisite to filing suit in federal court.26

20. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); see also Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242
(1972); Bracey v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Bridgeport, 368 F.3d 108, 115 (2d Cir. 2004).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
22. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985).
23. Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 735 (2009) (quoting Mitchum, 407 U.S. at
242 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
24. Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of St. of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 504 (1982) (alteration in
original) (quoting the remarks of Congressman Lowe).
25. Haywood, 556 U.S. at 735 (“[S]tate courts as well as federal courts are
entrusted with providing a forum for the vindication of federal rights violated by state
or local officials acting under color of state law.”).
26. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 507.
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Habeas

A writ of habeas corpus is a writ “employed to bring a person
before a court, most frequently to ensure that the party’s
imprisonment or detention is not illegal.”27 Federal habeas relief may
be sought by a state prisoner through 28 U.S.C. § 2254, where the
petitioner claims that his or her imprisonment violates the
Constitution or federal law.28 Unlike under § 1983, under § 2254 state
prisoners must exhaust state remedies before properly seeking federal
habeas relief.29 Moreover, the writ is generally available only to those
“in custody.”30 Habeas petitions filed while the petitioner was in
custody are usually dismissed as moot once the prisoner is released, a
result that potentially forecloses any means of collateral attack on the
conviction.31

3.

Collisions at the Intersection

Each statute permits a claimant to seek redress for a state actor’s
violation of federally protected rights. This overlap has raised
concerns that “the no-exhaustion rule of § 1983 might, in the absence
of some limitation, devour the exhaustion rule of the habeas corpus
statute.”32 Without a limitation, for example, a prisoner could file suit
under § 1983, even though success in that suit would necessarily imply
that the underlying conviction is invalid, which in turn would require
that the claimant be released (a function primarily reserved for
habeas). Moreover, that claimant would be free from the exhaustion
requirements mandated under habeas. In Preiser v. Rodriguez, the
Supreme Court held that, although certain claims may fit within the
literal terms of § 1983’s broad language, Congress specifically
determined that habeas corpus’s strong policy of avoiding
unnecessary friction between the federal and state court systems
mandates that habeas corpus be the exclusive remedy for state
prisoners attacking the validity of the fact or length of their

27. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 728 (8th ed. 2004).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2012).
29. Id. § 2254(b)(1)(A).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2012); see also infra note 65 and accompanying cases.
31. See infra Part II.A.4.
32. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 503–04 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(“Indeed, every application by a state prisoner for federal habeas corpus relief
against his jailers could, as a matter of logic and semantics, be viewed as an action
under the Ku Klux Klan Act to obtain injunctive relief against ‘the deprivation,’ by
one acting under color of state law, ‘of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.”).
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confinement.33 However, that decision left open the question of
whether claims that ordinarily sound in habeas, because they
challenge the validity of an outstanding conviction, may properly be
brought under § 1983 if habeas is no longer available. As discussed
below, the dueling dicta in Heck and Spencer left the answer unclear.
B.

Heck and Spencer

1.

Heck v. Humphrey

Roy Heck was convicted in an Indiana state court of voluntary
manslaughter for killing his wife.34 Sentenced to fifteen years in
prison, Heck filed a § 1983 suit in the Southern District of Indiana
alleging that state police officers and prosecutors had “engaged in an
‘unlawful, unreasonable, and arbitrary investigation’ leading to
[Heck’s] arrest; ‘knowingly destroyed’ evidence ‘which was
exculpatory in nature and could have proved [Heck’s] innocence’; and
caused ‘an illegal and unlawful voice identification procedure’ to be
used at [his] trial.”35 Although these claims may properly have been
brought in a habeas petition seeking release from custody, Heck
sought only damages.36 The district court dismissed the suit because
success on the alleged claims would have challenged the legality of
Heck’s outstanding conviction,37 and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.38
Writing for the panel, Judge Posner concluded that:
If regardless of the relief sought, a [§ 1983] plaintiff is challenging
the legality of his conviction, so that if he won his case the state
would be obligated to release him even if he hadn’t sought that
relief, the suit is classified as an application for habeas corpus and
the plaintiff must exhaust state remedies, on pain of dismissal if he
fails to do so.39

The Supreme Court thus was presented with the question of
whether § 1983’s broad scope reached damages claims that, if
successful, could affect a collateral attack on an outstanding criminal
conviction. The Court answered in the negative and affirmed the

33. See id. at 489–90.
34. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 478 (1994).
35. Id. at 479.
36. At the time Heck filed his § 1983 claim, a habeas petition would have been
deemed unexhausted because his direct appeal of the conviction was still pending.
See Heck v. Humphrey, 997 F.2d 355, 357 (7th Cir. 1993).
37. Heck, 512 U.S. at 479.
38. Heck, 997 F.2d at 359.
39. Id. at 357.
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Seventh Circuit.40 Although the Court in Preiser v. Rodriguez41 had
suggested, in dicta, that a prisoner seeking only damages rather than
challenging the fact or length of confinement may be able to seek
relief under § 1983, Justice Scalia clarified that the Court’s decision in
Preiser was not rooted in the particular relief sought, but rather in the
nature of the claim.42 Addressing the Preiser dicta directly, Justice
Scalia explained, “[the] statement [that a suit for damages under
§ 1983 is proper] may not be true, however, when establishing the
basis for the damages claim necessarily demonstrates the invalidity of
the conviction. In that situation, the claimant can be said to be
‘attacking . . . the fact or length of . . . confinement.’”43 Thus, because
the end result of a successful suit by Heck would result in the very
relief prohibited by Preiser, it was barred under § 1983.
The Court analogized Heck’s claims to the common law tort of
malicious prosecution.
To succeed on a claim of malicious
prosecution, a plaintiff must show a favorable termination of the
underlying conviction.44 This requirement, explained Justice Scalia, is
grounded in “the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not
appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding
criminal judgments.”45 Accordingly, extending this principle to
Heck’s claim “avoids parallel litigation . . . and it precludes the
possibility of the claimant succeeding in the tort action after having
been convicted in the underlying criminal prosecution.”46 This result
is consistent with the “strong judicial policy against the creation of
two conflicting resolutions arising out of the same or identical
transaction.”47 The Supreme Court set forth the governing standard
as follows:
We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm
caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or
sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or
sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive
order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such

40. Heck, 512 U.S. at 490.
41. 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
42. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 481–82.
43. Id. at 481–82 (alterations in original) (quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 490).
44. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §
119, at 874 (5th ed. 1984).
45. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486.
46. Id. at 484 (quoting 8 S. SPEISER ET AL., AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 28:5, at 24
(1991)).
47. Id.
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determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages
bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not
been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.48

As a threshold matter, therefore, district courts must determine
whether a prisoner’s § 1983 claim implies the invalidity of an
outstanding conviction.49 If so, the suit is not cognizable under § 1983,
and the prisoner’s remedy is properly sought in habeas.50 Because
Heck failed to secure a favorable termination of the conviction upon
which his damages claims rested, his § 1983 claims could not lie.51
While it was clear that the plaintiff need not show a favorable
termination when success on a § 1983 claim bears no relationship to
the validity of an outstanding conviction,52 the Court divided on the
applicability of the favorable-termination requirement when, by
virtue of the prisoner’s release from custody, habeas is not a viable
option. That is, is a showing of favorable termination required when
success on a § 1983 claim challenges the validity of an outstanding
conviction but the claimant has no access to habeas? In a concurring
opinion, Justice Souter, joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and
O’Connor, argued for a narrower holding, applying the favorabletermination requirement only to § 1983 claims brought by claimants
who still had access to habeas relief.53 Applying the rule beyond that,
Justice Souter explained, “would needlessly place at risk the rights of
those outside the intersection of § 1983 and the habeas statute,
individuals not ‘in custody’ for habeas purposes.”54 The concurring
Justices believed that transposing a favorable-termination
requirement on § 1983 claims brought by prisoners (both current and
former) contravened the purpose behind § 1983,55 and that the
majority’s common law analysis was best limited to actions where
§ 1983 and habeas overlap.56

48. Id. at 486–87 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
49. See id. at 487.
50. See id. at 489 (“We do not engraft an exhaustion requirement upon § 1983,
but rather deny the existence of a cause of action.”); see also Martin A. Schwartz,

The Supreme Court’s Unfortunate Narrowing of the Section 1983 Remedy for Brady
Violations, CHAMPION, May 2013, at 58, 59.
51. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 489.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 500 (Souter, J., concurring).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 501–02.
56. See id. at 497–98.
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The majority rejected Justice Souter’s concerns, responding that
“the principle barring collateral attacks—a longstanding and deeply
rooted feature of both the common law and our own jurisprudence—
is not rendered inapplicable by the fortuity that a convicted criminal
is no longer incarcerated.”57 However, because the Court’s holding in
Heck did not turn on whether Heck was in custody (and therefore
whether he had access to habeas), it remained unclear how far the
Heck bar extended.58

2.

Spencer v. Kemna

In Spencer v. Kemna,59 Randy Spencer filed a habeas petition
challenging a decision by the Missouri Board of Probation and Parole
to revoke his parole.60 Before a decision on Spencer’s petition was
issued, his prison term expired and he was released.61 Because
Spencer was no longer in custody, the district court dismissed his
petition as moot.62 Spencer argued on appeal that if his habeas
petition was deemed moot, he would have no federal remedy because
under Heck he would likewise be barred from bringing an action
under § 1983.63 Again writing for the majority, Justice Scalia rejected
Spencer’s assertion as “a great non sequitur,” because the Court,
reemphasizing its holding in Heck, does not believe that “a § 1983
action for damages must always and everywhere be available.”64 In
any event, because Spencer chose not to file his claims under § 1983,
the Court did not find occasion to reach the question posited by
Justice Souter’s concurring opinion in Heck. Rather, because
Spencer could not show collateral consequences flowing from his
outstanding conviction,65 his claim was not cognizable on federal
habeas review and the rulings of the lower courts were affirmed.66

57. Id. at 490 n.10 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
58. See Jason A. Jones, Note, Prisoner Litigation and the Mistake of Jenkins v.
Haubert, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 140, 145–48, 160–61 (2000); Thomas Stephen
Schneidau, Note, Favorable Termination After Freedom: Why Heck’s Rule Should
Reign, Within Reason, 70 LA. L. REV. 647, 655–58 (2010).
59. 523 U.S. 1 (1998).
60. Id. at 3.
61. See id. at 6.
62. Id. (dismissing the petition “[b]ecause . . . the sentences at issue here have
expired, petitioner is no longer in custody within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a),
and his claim for habeas corpus relief is moot” (internal quotations omitted)).
63. See id. at 17. Spencer’s conviction, after all, remained outstanding, but his
release from custody precluded him from seeking relief through habeas. Id.
64. See id.
65. In January 2013, the Supreme Court clearly stated that “federal habeas
petitioners, by definition, are incarcerated, not on probation.” Ryan v. Gonzales, 133
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Justice Souter concurred to correct Spencer’s flawed assumption
that if habeas relief were not available to him, a claim under § 1983
would likewise be barred under Heck for failure to prove a favorable
termination:
[Spencer] assumes that Heck . . . held or entails that conclusion . . . .
If Spencer were right on this point, his argument would provide a
reason, whether or not dispositive, to recognize continuing standing
to litigate his habeas claim. But he is wrong; Heck did not hold that
a released prisoner in Spencer’s circumstances is out of court on a
§ 1983 claim, and for reasons explained in my Heck concurrence, it
would be unsound to read either Heck or the habeas statute as
requiring any such result.67

Justice Souter suggested a “better view,” where “a former prisoner,
no longer ‘in custody,’ may bring a § 1983 action establishing the
unconstitutionality of a conviction or confinement without being
bound to satisfy a favorable-termination requirement that it would be
impossible as a matter of law for him to satisfy.”68 Such a position is a
“simple way to avoid collisions at the intersection of habeas and
§ 1983” and does require engrafting a new (and often difficult to
prove) element into a method of relief intended to operate broadly.69
Here, like in Heck, the Court did not hold expressly that those no
longer in custody and without recourse through habeas must still
satisfy a favorable-termination requirement to proceed under
§ 1983.70 Spencer’s significance, however, is derived from the fact that
S. Ct. 696, 707 (2013). Other courts have suggested, however, that there are certain
circumstances under which an individual, even though released on probation, may be
eligible for federal habeas relief because the conditions of parole are so restrictive as
to amount to a restraint of liberty. See, e.g., Burd v. Sessler, 702 F.3d 429, 435 (7th
Cir. 2012); Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 894 (2d Cir.
1996).
66. See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 18.
67. Id. at 19 (Souter, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted). Justice Souter
conceded, however, that:
[T]he majority opinion in Heck can be read to suggest that this favorabletermination requirement is an element of any § 1983 action alleging
unconstitutional conviction, whether or not leading to confinement and
whether or not any confinement continued when the § 1983 action was
filed. Indeed, although Heck did not present such facts, the majority
acknowledged the possibility that even a released prisoner might not be
permitted to bring a § 1983 action implying the invalidity of a conviction or
confinement without first satisfying the favorable-termination requirement.
Id. at 19–20.
68. Id. at 21.
69. Id. at 20.
70. See id. at 17 (majority opinion) (“It is not certain, in any event, that
a § 1983 damages claim would be foreclosed. If, for example, petitioner were to seek
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four Justices agreed with Justice Souter’s conception of the
relationship between habeas and § 1983.71
Justices O’Connor,
Ginsburg, and Breyer joined in Justice Souter’s concurrence.72 Justice
Ginsburg, a member of the Heck majority, concurred separately to
express her agreement with Justice Souter’s limited reading of Heck:
“I have come to agree with Justice Souter’s reasoning: Individuals
without recourse to the habeas statute because they are not ‘in
custody’ . . . fit within § 1983’s ‘broad reach.’”73 Likewise, Justice
Stevens endorsed this view in his dissent.74 Thus, five Justices,
although not in any one majority opinion, supported the proposition
that a prisoner no longer in custody need not satisfy a favorable
termination requirement to bring an action under § 1983, even if
success in that action necessarily implies the invalidity of an
outstanding conviction.75 This left the federal circuit courts to
extrapolate and apply the true “majority” position. The result,
predictably, was a circuit split.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER CUSTODY AND HECK’S
FAVORABLE-TERMINATION REQUIREMENT
Part II of this Article details the differing approaches taken by the
United States Courts of Appeals in determining whether an exprisoner’s suit for damages may proceed. The circuit courts have
reached conflicting conclusions over whether Heck’s bar is
unqualified, preventing suits by those who have no remedy in habeas.
In particular, four circuits have refused to find any exceptions to
Heck’s bar, while seven rely on Justice Souter’s concurrences to

damages ‘for using the wrong procedures, not for reaching the wrong result,’ and if
that procedural defect did not ‘necessarily imply the invalidity of’ the revocation,
then Heck would have no application all.” (internal citations omitted)).
71. For a discussion of the weight to be accorded Justice Souter’s Spencer
principle versus footnote 10 in Heck, see Bruce Ellis Fein, Heck v. Humphrey After
Spencer v. Kemna, 28 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 1, 23–25 (2002).
72. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 18 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Breyer replaced
Justice Blackmun, who joined Justice Souter’s concurrence in Heck, on the Court.
Justice Stevens, who also joined Justice Souter’s Heck concurrence, adopted the
position in a separate dissent. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 22 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
73. Id. at 21 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 25 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Given the Court’s holding that
petitioner does not have a remedy under the habeas statute, it is perfectly clear, as
Justice Souter explains, that he may bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”).
75. See, e.g., Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 752 n.2 (2004) (per curiam)
(“Members of the Court have expressed the view that unavailability of habeas for
other reasons may also dispense with the Heck requirement. This case is no occasion
to settle the issue.” (citations omitted)).
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support limited exceptions requiring good faith and practicality. This
Part examines the varied approaches to answering this question.
A. Circuit Courts Finding that Custody Is Irrelevant Under
Heck’s Binding Precedent
Four circuit courts have held that Heck’s bar to § 1983 suits that
imply the invalidity of an extant conviction is absolute and remains
unaffected by the Spencer concurrence and dissent.

1.

The First Circuit

Five months after Spencer, in Figueroa v. Rivera,76 the First Circuit
became the first U.S. appeals court to grapple with the application of
Heck’s favorable-termination requirement to a prisoner without a
habeas remedy. In Figueroa, the plaintiffs sued on behalf of a relative
who died in prison while his state habeas petition was “languish[ing]”
in court.77 Because of the prisoner’s death, the district court dismissed
his habeas petition as moot.78 The § 1983 suit alleged constitutional
violations against members of law enforcement who had allegedly
framed and prosecuted the prisoner for the crime for which he was
incarcerated at the time of his death.79 The district court dismissed
the action for failure to state a claim, invoking Heck’s explanation
that the Court’s holding “do[es] not engraft an exhaustion
requirement upon § 1983, but rather den[ies] the existence of a cause
of action.”80
The First Circuit upheld the district court’s decision. Although
plaintiff’s claim of “fundamental unfairness” struck “a responsive
chord,” the court nevertheless held that Heck barred the claim:
“Here, the appellants do not allege that an authorized tribunal or
executive body overturned or otherwise invalidated [the decedent’s]
conviction. Consequently, Heck bars the unconstitutional conviction
and imprisonment claims.”81 Heck left no room for equitable
exceptions and absent a clearer directive from the Supreme Court,
the First Circuit declined to find one.
In a footnote, the First Circuit discussed and rejected the notion
that the concurring and dissenting opinions in Heck and Spencer can

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

147 F.3d 77 (1st Cir. 1998).

See id. at 79.
See id. at 79–80.
See id. at 80.
See id.; see also Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489 (1994).
Figueroa, 147 F.3d at 80-81.
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be read to provide an exception to Heck’s otherwise sweeping
favorable-termination requirement:
We are mindful that dicta from concurring and dissenting opinions
in a recently decided case may cast doubt upon the universality of
Heck’s “favorable termination” requirement. The Court, however,
has admonished the lower federal courts to follow its directly
applicable precedent, even if that precedent appears weakened by
pronouncements in its subsequent decisions, and to leave to the
Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions. We obey this
admonition.82

Fifteen years later, Figueroa remains good law in the First Circuit.83

2.

The Fifth Circuit

84

In Randell v. Johnson, the Fifth Circuit addressed a § 1983 claim
by an ex-inmate seeking damages for an allegedly improper sentence
calculation.85 Police arrested Randell and charged him with driving
while intoxicated.86 Randell alleged that he was incarcerated from
September 1996 to June 1997 because of a warrant from the Texas
Board of Pardons and Paroles.87 Randell alleged that he was not
given credit for this time and consequently had to serve that time over
again.88 When Randell filed his § 1983 suit, he was no longer in
custody and therefore could not file a habeas petition.89 He sought
compensatory damages of $1000 per day for each day doubly-served.90
The district court dismissed the suit as frivolous.91
The Fifth Circuit affirmed on the grounds that Randell’s suit failed
to state a claim.92 Like the plaintiffs in Figueroa, Randell argued that
he need not meet Heck’s favorable-termination requirement because

82. Id. at 81 n.3 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
83. See, e.g., Traudt v. Roberts, No. 10-CV-12-JL, 2013 WL 3754862, at *6–7
(D.N.H. July 15, 2013) (“This court, of course, is bound to follow directly applicable
precedent from the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
That
precedent, Figueroa, expressly rejects the notion that—notwithstanding the
concurring opinion in Spencer—Heck does not apply when the plaintiff can no longer
obtain habeas relief from the conviction that his § 1983 suit calls into question.”).
84. 227 F.3d 300 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam).
85. See id. at 300–01.
86. Id. at 300.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 301.
90. Id. at 300–01.
91. Id. at 300.
92. Id. at 301.
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he was ineligible for federal habeas relief.93 The Fifth Circuit rejected
Randell’s assertion, finding that Heck unequivocally requires a
plaintiff seeking damages in a § 1983 suit to first demonstrate a
favorable termination.94
Consistent with the Figueroa court’s approach, the Fifth Circuit
rejected the argument that Justice Souter’s concurrences changed the
post-Heck legal landscape: “[W]e decline to announce for the
Supreme Court that it has overruled one of its decisions [and we]
agree with the First Circuit.”95

3.

The Third Circuit

96

In Gilles v. Davis, decided in 2005, the Third Circuit expanded
Heck’s bar against § 1983 claims to guilty pleas and entry into an
“Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition” (ARD) program.97
University police charged plaintiff Timothy Petit with “resisting
arrest, disorderly conduct, and failure of disorderly persons to
disperse.”98 Released from custody that same day, Petit entered into
the ARD program that “permits expungement of the criminal record
Petit
upon successful completion of a probationary term.”99
100
successfully completed the program, and then filed a § 1983
complaint seeking damages for multiple alleged First Amendment
violations.101
The district court dismissed Petit’s claims as barred by Heck.102
Despite Petit’s successful completion of the ARD program, the
district court found that under Heck, expungement under an ARD

93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id.; see, e.g., Thomas v. Louisiana Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 406 F. App’x 890,
898 n.5 (5th Cir. 2010) (“In Randell, we noted that several other circuits do not
apply Heck’s favorable termination rule when the plaintiff is no longer in custody.
The Supreme Court has suggested that this issue is unsettled. Regardless of this
uncertainty, Randell remains good law in this circuit, and we share its reluctance
to ‘announce for the Supreme Court that it has overruled one of its decisions.’”
(citations omitted)); Walker v. LeBlanc, No. 12-CV-1950, 2012 WL 6962108, at *1
(W.D. La. Nov. 28, 2012).
96. 427 F.3d 197 (3rd Cir. 2005).
97. See id. at 201.
98. Id. at 202.
99. See id.
100. Id. at 209.
101. See id. at 203.
102. Id. at 208.
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program is not a favorable termination of the conviction.103 The Third
Circuit agreed and affirmed the dismissal.
The court reasoned that the principle in favor of avoiding parallel
litigation that could result in conflicting adjudications was equally
applicable in the ARD context because acceptance into the ARD
program “may be construed as a conviction for purposes of
computing sentences on subsequent convictions,” and “[b]y entering
the ARD program, the defendant waives his right to prove his
innocence”:104
Petit’s underlying disorderly conduct charge and his § 1983 First
Amendment claim require answering the same question—whether
Petit’s behavior constituted protected activity or disorderly conduct.
If ARD does not constitute a favorable termination, success in the
§ 1983 claim would result in parallel litigation over whether Petit’s
activity constituted disorderly conduct and could result in a
conflicting resolution arising from the same conduct.105

Recognizing that some courts had questioned Heck’s continued
validity in light of the Spencer concurrences and dissent, the Third
Circuit joined the First and Fifth Circuits in rejecting that
contention.106

4.

The Eighth Circuit
107

In Entzi v. Redmann, the Eighth Circuit in 2007 became the
fourth federal appeals court to hold that Heck’s favorabletermination requirement was not subject to exceptions. In Entzi, the
plaintiff filed a § 1983 suit to recover damages for the loss of
performance-based sentence-reduction credits that allegedly
extended the term of his sentence by more than a year.108 The district
court dismissed Entzi’s civil rights suit on the pleadings, and the
Eighth Circuit affirmed.109

103. See id. at 209.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 209–10 (adhering to “the Supreme Court’s admonition to lower
federal courts to follow its directly applicable precedent, even if that precedent
appears weakened by pronouncements in its subsequent decisions, and to leave to the
Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions” (internal quotations omitted)).
Gilles remains good law in the Third Circuit. See, e.g., Ashton v. City of Uniontown,
459 F. App’x 185, 187–88 (3d Cir. 2012); Robinson v. N.J. State Police, No. 11-6070,
2012 WL 5944381, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 27, 2012).
107. 485 F.3d 998 (8th Cir. 2007).
108. See id. at 1003.
109. Id. at 1000.
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The Eighth Circuit found that a person challenging the duration of
imprisonment or the loss of sentence-reduction credits must do so by
seeking a writ of habeas corpus.110 Habeas corpus was no longer
available to Entzi because it was both untimely and mooted by his
release from prison.111 Entzi, like the plaintiffs in Figueroa, Randell,
and Gilles, argued that this removed his case from Heck’s grasp.112
The court recognized no such exception:
Entzi relies on a later decision of the Supreme Court, in which a
combination of five concurring and dissenting Justices agreed in
dicta that “a former prisoner, no longer ‘in custody,’ may bring a
§ 1983 action establishing the unconstitutionality of a conviction or
confinement without being bound to satisfy a favorable-termination
requirement that it would be impossible as a matter of law for him to
satisfy.” Absent a decision of the Court that explicitly overrules
what we understand to be the holding of Heck, however, we decline
to depart from that rule.113

In sum, these Circuits recognized the potential for unfairness
inherent in such a strict application of Heck’s bar, but their decisions
reflect an unwillingness to carve out any exceptions that, in their view,
would impermissibly deviate from Supreme Court precedent. Having
“definitively decided, in the negative, the question of whether a
prisoner who is precluded from pursuing habeas relief can file a
§ 1983 action” that challenges the validity of an outstanding
conviction,114 the prerogative to alter that holding rests solely with the
Supreme Court.

110. See id. at 1003.
111. See id. at 1000, 1003.
112. See id. at 1003.
113. Id. (internal citations omitted). Courts in the Eight Circuit continue to apply
Entzi’s interpretation of Heck. See, e.g., Marlowe v. Fabian, 676 F.3d 743, 746–47
(8th Cir. 2012) (“We have recognized that this type of § 1983 plaintiff must show a
favorable termination by state or federal authorities even when he is no longer
incarcerated.”); Newmy v. Johnson, No. 3:13CV00132 JLH–JTR, 2013 WL 2552734,
at *2 (E.D. Ark. June 10, 2013) (“The minority of circuits, including the Eighth
Circuit, have held that Heck’s holding is not limited to those in custody and that
because the statements in Spencer are dicta, those statements do not overrule Heck’s
holding.”).
114. Dible v. Scholl, 410 F. Supp. 2d 807, 822 (N.D. Iowa 2006).
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Circuit Courts Finding that the Spencer “Majority” Permits
Exceptions to the Heck Bar in Limited Circumstances

Six circuits115 have taken the position that in Spencer, five of the
nine Justices embraced a less expansive interpretation of Heck that
permits civil rights suits to proceed even if their success would
necessarily imply the invalidity of an extant conviction. These
holdings do not stand for the proposition that some federal remedy
must always be available. To the contrary, these courts crafted their
exceptions to Heck’s otherwise broad prohibition in a very limited
fashion, usually requiring that the plaintiff never had, or never would
have (on mootness grounds), an opportunity to petition for a writ of
habeas corpus.

1.

The Eleventh Circuit

The Eleventh Circuit in Harden v. Pataki116 permitted a § 1983
claim to proceed when federal habeas relief was no longer available.
In Harden, the court held “that a claim filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 seeking damages and declaratory relief for the violation of a
state prisoner’s federally protected extradition rights is not
automatically barred by Heck.”117 In 1986, while serving a twenty-five
year sentence in Kansas, plaintiff Major Harden was extradited to
Suffolk County, New York, where he was convicted and sentenced to
another twenty-five year term for a separate crime.118 After release
from confinement in 2000 on yet another crime, Harden alleged that
he was extradited to New York to serve the sentence imposed on the
1986 conviction without a warrant, waiver of his rights, or a habeas
hearing.119 The district court applied Heck and dismissed the suit for
failing to state a cognizable claim because the 1986 conviction
remained unchallenged.120
The Eleventh Circuit reversed. First, the court found that the
alleged violations of extradition procedures, namely the failure to
procure a signed warrant or hold a habeas hearing, do not relate to
Harden’s guilt or innocence.121 Therefore, the court reasoned, success

115. This does not include the Second Circuit, which is discussed separately in Part
II.C., infra.
116. 320 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2003).
117. Id. at 1301–02.
118. Id. at 1292.
119. Id.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 1298.
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on Harden’s claim would not conflict with his underlying
conviction.122 Accordingly, Harden’s claim fell outside Heck’s scope.
The court also found a “second reason” why Heck did not bar
Harden’s suit.123 Unlike those courts discussed in Part II.A, the
Eleventh Circuit abided by the Spencer concurring and dissenting
opinions’ explanation that “Heck should be read as permitting a
prisoner to bring a § 1983 action establishing the unconstitutionality
of a conviction or confinement without being bound to satisfy a
favorable-termination requirement that it would be impossible as a
matter of law for him to satisfy.”124 The court found this rationale
directly applicable to Harden because habeas relief is not available
once a person has been extradited, even if the extradition was
illegal.125 Applying the Spencer analysis to Harden, the court rejected
the untenable result that “a claim for relief brought by a person
already extradited would be placed beyond the scope of § 1983, when
exactly the same claim could be redressed if brought by a person to
be, but not yet, extradited.”126 To hold otherwise, the court
concluded, would “deny any federal forum for claiming a deprivation
of federal rights to those who cannot first obtain a favorable state
ruling.”127

2.

The Ninth Circuit

The following cases are illustrative of limited exceptions to Heck’s
bar recognized by the Ninth Circuit. In Cunningham v. Gates,128 the
court held that Cunningham’s claims were unaffected by Heck even
though he no longer had access to habeas.129 It was not that
Cunningham was never or no longer incarcerated; it was simply that

122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id. (internal quotations omitted).
125. See id. at 1299.
126. Id.
127. See id. at 1298 (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 500 (1994) (Souter,
J., concurring) (emphasis added)). Within the Eleventh Circuit, however, this
holding is read narrowly. In Domotor v. Wennet, 630 F. Supp. 2d 1368 (S.D. Fla.
2009), aff’d, 356 F. App’x 316 (11th Cir. 2009), the district court barred a § 1983 claim
where the plaintiff, although now ineligible for habeas relief, had not pursued that
means of redress when it was available. Id. at 1380. The court found that to allow the
plaintiff to circumvent the applicable state exhaustion requirements but permit a
collateral attack in federal court is the exact circumstance that Heck sought to
prevent. See id.
128. 312 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2002).
129. See id. at 1153 n.3.
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he had let the time in which to file a petition lapse.130 The court
rejected Cunningham’s argument that Heck was inapposite under
these circumstances, finding the argument inconsistent with the view
taken by the concurring and dissenting Spencer Justices.131 Habeas
relief was “impossible as a matter of law” in Cunningham’s case
because he failed to pursue it in a timely manner, not simply because
he was no longer incarcerated. The court declined to permit
Cunningham’s own (and seemingly intentional) failure to timely
pursue a remedy under habeas to operate as a means to circumvent
Heck’s reach.132
However, just two weeks after the court’s decision in Cunningham,
the Ninth Circuit in Nonnette v. Small133 permitted a § 1983 claim to
proceed even though, like in Cunningham, the plaintiff was barred
from seeking relief through habeas. In Nonnette, the plaintiff, while
incarcerated, stabbed another inmate during a prison fight.134 A
disciplinary proceeding assessed Nonnette a 360-day loss of goodtime credits and 100 days in administrative segregation.135 Nonnette
first exhausted his prison administrative remedies, as required by
§ 1983, before seeking alternative forms of relief.136 The remedy for
such “good time” deprivation is ordinarily found in a petition for writ
of habeas corpus, but Nonnette was ineligible for habeas relief
because he already had been released from custody.137 Under those
circumstances, the Ninth Circuit held that Heck did not bar Nonnette
from maintaining a § 1983 claim.138 Distinguishing the facts from
Cunningham, the court premised its decision in Nonnette on the
plaintiff’s timely attempt to satisfy the favorable-termination
requirement, the failure of which was directly attributable to the
brevity of his incarceration.139 Moreover, the court recognized that it

130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. 316 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2002).
134. Id. at 874.
135. Id.
136. See id. at 874 n.2.
137. See id. at 875–76.
138. Id. at 876.
139. See id. at 874–77 & n.6 (emphasis added) (“The fact that Nonnette has been
released from the incarceration that his civil suit, if successful, would impugn, and
that a habeas petition would be moot for that reason, differentiates this case from our
recent decision in Cunningham v. Gates, 312 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2002). In
Cunningham, the plaintiff brought a civil suit that would have impugned the
conviction for which he was still incarcerated; habeas corpus was unavailable only
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was not Nonnette’s underlying conviction that gave rise to his § 1983
suit, but rather the procedures by which his incarceration allegedly
was extended. Thus, like the court in Harden, the Ninth Circuit
found Heck not directly applicable.140
Unlike the Eleventh Circuit in Harden, however, the Ninth Circuit
refused to consider that the concurring and dissenting opinions in
Spencer had affected Heck’s precedential power.141 Additionally, the
Nonnette court “emphasize[d]” that its holding “affects only former
prisoners challenging loss of good-time credits, revocation of parole
or similar matters.”142 Thus, plaintiffs seeking damages for pure
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment claims must still satisfy
Heck’s favorable-termination requirement regardless of custodial
status or habeas availability.143
These cases are contrasted appropriately with the Ninth Circuit’s
holding in Guerrero v. Gates,144 where the court held plaintiff’s § 1983
claims of wrongful arrest, malicious prosecution, and conspiracy
barred by Heck because, although no longer in custody, the plaintiff
never challenged his convictions prior to his civil rights suit.145
Nonnette, the court explained, “was founded on the unfairness of
barring a plaintiff’s potentially legitimate constitutional claims when
the individual immediately pursued relief after the incident giving rise
to those claims and could not seek habeas relief only because of the
shortness of his prison sentence.”146 The court reiterated that
Nonnette’s reprieve from Heck was limited to challenges to prison
administrative proceedings, not to challenges to an extant
conviction.147

because he had let the time for such a petition expire. Under those circumstances, we
declined to take the case out of the rule of Heck.”).
140. See id. at 877 n.5.
141. See id. (“We recognize that, if Heck precluded Nonnette’s action, we would
not be free to consider it undermined by the opinions in Spencer. The Supreme Court
retains the sole prerogative of overruling its own decisions. We conclude that Heck
does not control, and reach that understanding of Heck’s original meaning with the
aid of the discussions in Spencer.”).
142. Id. at 877 n.7.
143. See id.; see also Garber v. City of Los Angeles Gen. Servs. Dep’t, 509 F.
App’x 667, 667 (9th Cir. 2013); Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 784–85 (9th Cir.
2012).
144. 442 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 2003).
145. See id. at 705.
146. Id.
147. See id.; see also Rouse v. Connor, No. 12-2121 PJH, 2012 WL 2368464, at *10
(N.D. Cal. June 21, 2012) (challenging an underlying conviction barred under
Nonnette); Wesbecher v. Landaker, No. CIV 01-2410, 2008 WL 2682614, at *4 (E.D.
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The Sixth Circuit

Similar to the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Nonnette, the Sixth Circuit
in Powers v. Hamilton County Public Defender Commission148
adopted the position that when a prisoner is precluded from seeking
the invalidation of his conviction through habeas because of a limited
term of incarceration, an action under § 1983 is not barred by Heck.
In Powers, the plaintiff pled no contest to misdemeanor reckless
driving, was sentenced to thirty days in jail, and fined $250.149
Twenty-seven days of the sentence were suspended, but Powers failed
to pay the fine in violation of his probation.150 He again pled no
contest, and the original thirty-day sentence was restored and
served.151 After his release, Powers sued the state’s public defender’s
office for failure to seek an indigency hearing to determine his ability
to pay the fine.152 The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of Powers.153
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court on two grounds. First,
the court held Heck inapplicable because Powers was foreclosed from
challenging his incarceration in a habeas petition.154 The court noted
that the dispositive factor was the length of Powers’ incarceration, not
the fact that he was no longer incarcerated.155 Unwilling to accept
that “Justice Souter intended to carve out a broad Heck exception for
all former prisoners,” the Sixth Circuit read the better rule as
precluding only those actions by former prisoners who had sufficient
access to habeas relief but chose not to pursue it.156 The court
rejected the reasoning of the First, Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits
that “decreed themselves bound by Heck to the exclusion of Justice
Souter’s comments in his Heck and Spencer concurrences.”157
Cal. July 1, 2008) (explaining that plaintiff’s failure to expeditiously seek habeas relief
while in custody foreclosed his § 1983 action under Nonnette).
148. 501 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 2007).
149. Id. at 597.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 597–98.
153. See id. at 598.
154. See id. at 601.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 601–02.
157. See id. at 602. This view has been called into question in subsequent Sixth
Circuit opinions. See, e.g., Harrison v. Michigan, 722 F.3d 768, 773–74 & n.1 (6th Cir.
2013) (“In the wake of Spencer, a circuit split has developed concerning the
significance of Justice Souter’s concurring opinion, with several circuits convinced
that it must be considered dictum because it was unnecessary to the holding of the
case (i.e., that Spencer’s habeas claim was moot), and other circuits, including our
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Instead, the Sixth Circuit limited Heck to its facts and followed “the
ordinary rule refinement that appellate courts [must] necessarily
engage in.”158 The court declined to cast aside the view of five
Justices in Spencer that Heck’s bar is not as expansive as it seems.159
The court also permitted Powers’ suit to proceed because the claims
in his § 1983 action challenged the procedures by which he was
incarcerated, and not the conviction itself.160

4.

The Fourth Circuit

In Wilson v. Johnson,161 decided in 2008, the Fourth Circuit sided
with those circuits interpreting Heck’s reach through the lens of the
Spencer concurrences and dissent. The opinion appears grounded in
a policy-based rationale, with the court expressing concern over the
possibility that strict adherence to Heck would mean that “[i]f a
prisoner could not, as a practical matter, seek habeas relief, and after
release, was prevented from filing a § 1983 claim, § 1983’s purpose of
providing litigants with ‘a uniquely federal remedy’ . . . would be
severely imperiled.”162 Wilson was to serve six months for grand
larceny of a motor vehicle.163 Scheduled for release in April of 2006,
the Virginia Department of Corrections changed the release date to
July of that same year.164 Wilson filed a grievance with the prison
administration, but received no response.165 Wilson was released in
July 2006 and thereafter filed suit seeking monetary damages for
wrongful imprisonment.166
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court, which had dismissed
Wilson’s claim. The court held that it was the broad reach of § 1983,
not of Heck, that must be weighed heavily.167 Reasoning that Heck
did not conclusively answer the question of whether a prisoner who,
own, equally convinced that because a majority of the Court endorsed it, the
concurring opinion created an exception to Heck’s favorable-termination
requirement. Hence, even though, in the 15 years since Spencer, the Supreme Court
has never recognized such an exception, we are bound by Powers and, therefore,
must treat Justice Souter’s ‘holding’ as law.”).
158. Powers, 501 F.3d at 602.
159. See id. at 603.
160. See id.
161. 535 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2008).
162. See id. at 262, 268 (quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271–72 (1985)
(internal citation omitted)).
163. Johnson, 535 F.3d at 263.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 263–64.
167. See id. at 266.
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because of the duration of his incarceration, effectively had no
remedy in habeas needed to meet the favorable-termination
requirement, the court rationalized that the Spencer plurality
provided a rule consistent with the “sweeping breadth, high purposes,
and uniqueness of § 1983.”168 “Quite simply,” the court concluded,
“we do not believe that a habeas ineligible former prisoner seeking
redress for denial of his most precious right—freedom—should be left
without access to a federal court.”169 Despite this far-reaching
sentiment, the court stopped short of recognizing a right to an allencompassing federal remedy.170

5.

The Tenth Circuit

In 2010, the Tenth Circuit in Cohen v. Longshore171 confronted
Heck’s applicability to false imprisonment claims based on allegedly
unlawful immigration detention. The court held that “[i]f a petitioner
is unable to obtain habeas relief—at least where this inability is not
due to the petitioner’s own lack of diligence—it would be unjust to
place his claim for relief beyond the scope of § 1983.”172 The Tenth
Circuit acknowledged the split and analyzed the merits of each side’s
position.173 The court could not agree with those circuits holding that
the Heck favorable-termination requirement unequivocally prevents
§ 1983 claims where a prisoner’s release forecloses a remedy under
habeas. Given the Supreme Court’s own admission in Muhammad v.
Close,174 and the fact that the prisoner in Heck was still incarcerated,
the court considered this to be an unsettled question of law and was
not persuaded that Heck must always be applied to petitioners
168. See id. at 268 (quotation marks omitted) (alterations omitted).
169. See id.
170. In its discussion of whether application of the Heck bar would unduly
frustrate the broad scope of § 1983, the court qualified prisoners as those who “could
not, as a practical matter, seek habeas relief.” Id. This suggests that the holding is
limited to prisoners, like those in Powers and Nonnette, who could not have filed a
habeas petition because of mootness or the fact that they were never incarcerated.
See id. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit has subsequently interpreted Johnson accordingly.
See, e.g., Campbell v. Beckley Police Dep’t, 390 F. App’x 246, 248 (4th Cir. 2010)
(“[W]hen a former prisoner is challenging the validity of his past confinement, and
due to his release ‘would be left without any access to federal court if his § 1983 claim
was barred[,]’ this court has allowed the former prisoner’s § 1983 claim to proceed.”
(emphasis added)).
171. 621 F.3d 1311 (10th Cir. 2010).
172. Id. at 1316–17.
173. See id. at 1315–17.
174. 540 U.S. 749 (2004); see also supra note 75 and accompanying text (noting that
it remains unsettled whether Heck’s favorable-termination requirement applies when
habeas is no longer available).

476

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLII

without a habeas remedy.175 The court further held that this approach
“is both more just and more in accordance with the purpose of
§ 1983.”176 But, like the Fourth Circuit in Wilson, the Tenth Circuit
applied a “practicality-based” exception and would only lift Heck’s
bar where the petitioner, for reasons outside of his own control, could
not first seek to invalidate the conviction through habeas.177

6.

The Seventh Circuit

Finally, in Burd v. Sessler,178 the Seventh Circuit addressed whether
a plaintiff may seek damages against prison officials in their
individual capacities for the alleged violation of an individual’s right
to access the courts without satisfying Heck’s favorable-termination
requirement. In Burd, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant prison
officials deprived him of access to the courts by preventing him from
using the prison library during the thirty-day window in which to file a
motion to withdraw his guilty plea.179 Burd never sought to set aside
his conviction through federal or state habeas petitions prior to filing
his § 1983 suit.180 Burd was released from prison in November 2011,
with parole scheduled to end one year later.181 The district court
dismissed Burd’s suit, finding the claim barred by Heck.182
The Seventh Circuit affirmed. First, the court held that success on
Burd’s claim—that he was denied access to the courts by prison
officials—would necessarily demonstrate that there was merit to his
claim and that he should have been able to withdraw his plea.183 This
result placed Burd’s claim squarely in Heck’s scope. Second, the
court rejected Burd’s claim that, because he was no longer in custody,
and therefore ineligible for habeas relief, Heck was inapplicable and
he should have been permitted to pursue his claim under § 1983.184
However, the court’s decision was not premised on a broad reading of
Heck’s bar; rather, Burd’s claim was rejected because he “could have

175. Cohen, 621 F.3d at 1316.
176. Id.
177. See id. at 1317; see also Taylor v. City of Bixby, Okla., No. 12-CV-0066-CVEFHM, 2012 WL 6115051, at *7 (N.D. Ok. Dec. 10, 2012) (“Pursuant to Cohen,
plaintiff’s claims are subject to the favorable-termination requirement if plaintiff has
not been diligent in pursuing his claims.”).
178. 702 F.3d 429 (7th Cir. 2012).
179. See id. at 430–31.
180. See id. at 431.
181. Id.
182. See id.
183. See id. at 434–35.
184. See id. at 435.
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sought collateral relief at an earlier time but declined the opportunity
and waited until collateral relief became unavailable before suing.”185
Adhering to the concerns of the concurring Justices in Spencer, while
at the same time refusing to permit an end-run around Heck, the
court in Burd took the position that only when a § 1983 plaintiff
ignores the opportunity to seek collateral relief while incarcerated
will his action be barred by Heck upon release.186
Although the circuits have split on the issue of whether Heck’s bar
is absolute regardless of the claimant’s custodial status, those circuits
following Justice Souter’s approach have limited their holdings,
finding Heck inapplicable most often when habeas relief is
unavailable through no fault of the plaintiff. Indeed, no circuit court
has read the Spencer concurrences to imply an absolute entitlement
to a federal remedy at any time for a constitutional violation. That is,
of course, until Poventud.
C.

Heck in the Second Circuit

The Court in Poventud II claimed that “[u]nder the law of this
Circuit, a plaintiff asserting the unconstitutionality of his conviction
or incarceration must have access to a federal remedy.”187 In the
wake of Poventud II’s vacatur, the question of how far the Second
Circuit took Justice Souter’s proposed Heck exception remains
unanswered.188 This Section catalogues the application of Heck and
Spencer in the Second Circuit prior to the Poventud line of cases,
informing the basis for Part IV’s discussion.

185. Id. at 436.
186. See id. at 435–36; see also DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 616–17 (7th Cir.
2000).
187. Poventud II, 715 F.3d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 2013), vacated en banc on other grounds,
750 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2014).
188. Compare Teichmann v. New York, 769 F.3d 821, 827 (2d Cir. 2014)
(Livingston, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in part)
(“Referring to this line of cases, Judge Calabresi describes the ‘law in this Circuit’ as
holding that ‘when a plaintiff does not have access to habeas—at least where the
plaintiff has not intentionally caused habeas to be unavailable—favorable
termination of the underlying sentence or conviction is not required.’ While our en
banc decision in Poventud v. City of New York may not have disturbed certain
precedents in this area, the Poventud panel decision has been vacated and I
respectfully disagree with my colleague’s characterization of our still-binding case
law.” (internal citations omitted)), with id. at 830 (Calabresi, J., concurring) (“I
believe that the law of our Circuit remains as it was despite our recent en banc
decision in Poventud.”).
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Jenkins v. Haubert

The Second Circuit’s first occasion to analyze the dual application
of Heck and Spencer arose in Jenkins v. Haubert.189 In Jenkins, the
court confronted the question of whether a § 1983 claim is cognizable
“where a prisoner (or former prisoner) alleges a constitutional
violation arising out of the imposition of intra-prison disciplinary
sanctions that have no effect on the duration of the prisoner’s overall
confinement.”190
Jenkins, a prisoner at Green Haven Correctional Facility, was the
subject of two disciplinary proceedings.191 At the first disciplinary
hearing on July 26, 1994, defendant Lieutenant Haubert denied
Jenkins’ request to call four witnesses on his behalf because none of
the individuals had witnessed the events precipitating the hearing.192
Haubert sentenced Jenkins to thirty days in “keep-lock.”193 After
unsuccessfully appealing to the Green Haven superintendent, Jenkins
filed a New York C.P.L.R. Article 78 claim alleging that Haubert’s
refusal to let the four witnesses testify amounted to a violation of
Jenkins’ due process rights.194 On November 23, 1994, Jenkins found
himself again before Lieutenant Haubert in a second disciplinary
hearing.195 Jenkins requested that Haubert recuse himself on bias
grounds, but Haubert denied the request.196 Haubert found Jenkins
guilty and sentenced him to an additional thirty days in keep-lock.197
Jenkins’ administrative appeal was denied as meritless.198
After the New York Supreme Court dismissed his Article 78 claim,
Jenkins filed suit under § 1983, alleging violations of his Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process.199 The district court dismissed
Jenkins’ claim, in relevant part, as barred by Heck’s favorable-

189. 179 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 1999).
190. See id. at 21.
191. See id. at 20.
192. Jenkins v. Haubert, No. 95 Civ. 5453, 1996 WL 350685, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June
26, 1996).
193. Jenkins, 179 F.3d at 20–21 (describing keep-lock as “a form of administrative
segregation in which the inmate is confined to his cell, deprived of participation in
normal prison routine, and denied contact with other inmates”).
194. Id. at 21.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See id. at 21.
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termination requirement.200 The district court reasoned that the
Supreme Court’s application of Heck in Edwards v. Balisok201
foreclosed challenges to intra-prison disciplinary decisions without
first showing favorable termination, even though the disciplinary
decision in Edwards affected the duration of the sentence.202
The Court of Appeals disagreed, recognizing a distinction between
challenges to the conditions of confinement, including disciplinary
sanctions such as keep-lock, and challenges to the fact or duration of
confinement.203 The court held that a § 1983 claimant challenging
only the conditions of confinement does not need to satisfy Heck’s
favorable-termination requirement because the challenged
disciplinary “convictions” were irrelevant to the fact or duration of
Jenkins’ sentence.204 The court further reasoned that applying Heck’s
bar in this situation “would contravene the pronouncement of five
justices that some federal remedy—either habeas corpus or § 1983—
must be available.”205

2.

Leather v. Eyck

On the same day that Jenkins was issued, the Second Circuit issued
Leather v. Eyck,206 relying on Jenkins’ implied secondary holding that
a § 1983 claim is not barred by Heck when a claimant is not in the
custody of the state and therefore has no remedy under habeas. John
Leather brought suit alleging that he was selectively prosecuted in
retaliation for the lawful exercise of his right to free speech.207
Leather claimed that members of the Putnam County Sheriff’s

200. Jenkins v. Haubert, No. 95 Civ. 5453, 1998 WL 148332, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
30, 1998).
201. 520 U.S. 641 (1997).
202. Jenkins, 1998 WL 148332, at *3.
203. Jenkins, 179 F.3d at 27. Balisok concerned a challenge to prison disciplinary
procedures that affected the loss of good-time credits. Balisok, 520 U.S. at 643. The
claimant alleged deceit and bias on the part of a prison official. Id. at 647. Thus,
although the claim was framed as challenging procedures, a successful outcome
would imply the invalidity of the imposed punishment.
204. Jenkins, 179 F.3d at 27.
205. See id. To be sure, the court cautioned that “[w]e do not rest our holding
solely on our tally of votes on the Court for Justice Souter’s view of Heck.” Id. The
court’s explanation, however, indicates that Heck was never really an issue because
the bar only applies if the claim challenges the conviction, and the court found that
Jenkins’s claim plainly did not. See id. Yet, the court indicated support for the idea
that a federal remedy must always be available.
206. 180 F.3d 420 (2d Cir. 1999) (Calabresi, J.). I note the author because of Judge
Calabresi’s central role in the Poventud debate discussed in Part III, infra.
207. Leather, 180 F.3d at 422.
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Department, in retaliation for Leather’s opposition of the
Department’s control of the county’s E-911 communications center,
waited for him to leave a restaurant where Leather had been dining
with his wife for the purpose of affecting an arrest for driving while
intoxicated.208 Leather was successfully prosecuted on a lesser charge,
assessed a $300 fine, and had his license suspended for ninety days.209
Because Leather was never in custody, he never had access to habeas
as a means of challenging his conviction. Recognizing that even
though the facts of Jenkins presented a challenge to conditions of
prison confinement, and thus did not trigger Heck’s favorabletermination requirement, the Leather panel nevertheless followed
Jenkins’ pronouncement that “to apply the Heck rule in such
circumstances [where habeas is not available] would contravene the
pronouncement of five justices that some federal remedy . . . must be
available.”210

3.

Green v. Montgomery

Months later, the Second Circuit reaffirmed the holding in Leather,
albeit in dicta in a footnote. In Green v. Montgomery,211 the court
certified questions to the New York Court of Appeals to determine
whether the district court’s grant of summary judgment was proper
under New York law.212 Defendants, who had won summary
judgment in the district court on collateral estoppel grounds, argued
in the alternative that permitting Green’s § 1983 claim to continue
would run afoul of Heck because a finding that the officers used
excessive force would imply the invalidity of Green’s conviction for
reckless endangerment.213 Writing for the panel, Judge Calabresi
rejected the defendants’ contention, pointing to the holding in
Leather: “We have held, however, that Heck acts only to bar § 1983
suits when the plaintiff has a habeas corpus remedy available to him
(i.e., when he is in state custody).”214 This was not, however, the basis
for the court’s ultimate holding, which certified questions to the New
York Court of Appeals because the resolution of the federal
questions presented in Green’s suit turned on unsettled questions of

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id.
Id.
Jenkins, 179 F.3d at 27.
219 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J.).

See id. at 55.
See id. at 60 n.3.
See id. (citing Leather, 180 F.3d at 423–24 and Jenkins, 179 F.3d at 21)).
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state law.215 When the New York Court of Appeals answered, the
Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of the defendants on that basis alone.216

4.

Huang ex rel. Yu v. Johnson

In Huang ex rel. Yu v. Johnson,217 the court addressed a § 1983 suit
alleging that New York state correction officers violated plaintiff’s
son’s constitutional rights by failing to conduct a hearing prior to
placement in a residential facility and failing to properly credit her
son’s sentence with time served, resulting in illegal custody for eightythree days.218 Analyzing the claim under Heck as a threshold matter,
the court reviewed the Circuit’s recent holdings in Jenkins, Leather,
and Sims v. Artuz219 and concluded that this line of cases precluded
the application of Heck’s bar to a § 1983 challenge where the plaintiff
was not in custody, even if it indeed challenges the fact or duration of
the incarceration.220
III. POVENTUD V. CITY OF NEW YORK
A. Background
In March 1997, two men robbed livery driver Yuonis Duopo at
gunpoint and shot him, non-fatally, in the head or neck.221 Although
an initial New York City Police Department (NYPD) Crime Scene
Unit (CSU) search of the cab revealed only a single shell casing, five
one-dollar bills, and a black hat, all found in the back seat, NYPD
Detective Frankie Rosado conducted a second search and uncovered
a wallet on the floor by the front passenger seat.222 The wallet
contained two ID cards belonging to Francisco Poventud.223 Armed

215. See id. at 60–61.
216. Green v. Montgomery, 245 F.3d 142, 143 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (“The
answer to the second certified question [concerning collateral estoppel] resolves all
federal issues in [Green’s] appeal.”).
217. 251 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2001).
218. See id. at 66–67.
219. 230 F.3d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding § 1983 action not barred where
challenge is to conditions of confinement, rather than fact or duration).
220. Huang, 251 F.3d at 75.
221. Poventud v. City of New York, No. 07 Civ. 3998, 2012 WL 727802, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2012) [hereinafter Poventud I].
222. Poventud III, 750 F.3d 121, 125 (2d Cir. 2014) (en banc); see also Poventud II,
715 F.3d 57, 58 (2d Cir. 2013), vacated en banc on other grounds, 750 F.3d 121 (2d
Cir. 2014).
223. Poventud III, 750 F.3d at 125.
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with a suspect, NYPD Sergeant Kenneth Umlauft prepared a photo
array using one of the ID photos and presented it to Duopo.224
Duopo positively identified Francisco Poventud as the shooter.225
However, unbeknownst to the NYPD, Francisco Poventud was
incarcerated at the time of the shooting.226 Thus, police turned to
Francisco’s brother, Marcos. Detectives replaced Francisco’s picture
with Marcos’s and showed the array again to Duopo.227 Upon seeing
the array a fourth time,228 Duopo positively identified Marcos
Poventud as his assailant.229 Police arrested Marcos and co-defendant
Robert Maldonado, both of whom Duopo subsequently identified in
a lineup.230 Police failed to preserve the original array containing
Francisco Poventud’s picture and failed to disclose Duopo’s original
identification to both the Bronx County District Attorney’s Office
and defense counsel.231
At trial, Marcos Poventud asserted an alibi defense: he testified
that on the night of the shooting he was playing video games at a
neighbor’s house.232 Duopo was the only witness at trial to identify
Marcos Poventud as the shooter, and it took him four times to do
so.233 Evidence of his initial identification of Francisco was never
presented. The jury convicted both defendants, convicting Poventud
of second degree attempted murder, first degree attempted robbery,
first degree assault, and second degree criminal possession of a
weapon.234 He was later sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of
ten to twenty years imprisonment.235
In 2002, Marcos’s alleged accomplice, Maldonado, successfully
challenged an evidentiary ruling, and the New York Court of Appeals
overturned his conviction.236 At the same time, however, Poventud’s

224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 125.
228. Duopo was unable to conclusively identify Marcos Poventud the first three
times he was shown a photo array containing Marcos’s picture. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. See id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. People v. Maldonado, 97 N.Y.2d 522, 743 N.Y.S.2d 389 (2002).
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conviction was affirmed, and leave to appeal was denied.237 Only
during Maldonado’s retrial did evidence of the suppressed
identification come to light.238
Maldonado was acquitted and
Poventud filed a motion pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure
Law § 440.10 to vacate his conviction on the ground that the
prosecution, albeit through no fault of their own, withheld evidence in
violation of Brady v. Maryland239 and People v. Rosario.240 The New
York Supreme Court, Bronx County, granted the motion in October
2005, some eight years after his conviction.241
The prosecution filed a notice of appeal and successfully argued
that Poventud should be denied bail while awaiting his retrial.242 As
an alternative disposition, the prosecution offered Poventud
immediate release if he pled guilty to third degree attempted robbery,
a non-violent Class-E felony.243 Poventud accepted the plea in
January 2006, was sentenced to one year, and was immediately
released.244
B.

Poventud I—The District Court

On May 22, 2007, Poventud filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York against, inter alia, the City of New York, alleging
deprivation “of his Due Process and Fair Trial rights under the Fifth,
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.”245
In June 2011,246 the
defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that Poventud’s
constitutional claims were barred by Heck.247 Finding that Poventud’s
suit was “rooted in due process violations arising from the

237. Poventud III, 750 F.3d at 125; see also People v. Poventud, 300 A.D.2d 223,
752 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1st Dep’t 2002), leave denied, 1 N.Y.3d 578, 775 N.Y.S.2d 794, 807
N.E.2d 907 (2003).
238. Poventud III, 750 F.3d at 125.
239. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
240. 9 N.Y.2d 286 (1961).
241. People v. Poventud, 802 N.Y.S.2d 605 (2005).
242. Poventud III, 750 F.3d at 126.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Poventud I, No. 07 Civ. 3998, 2012 WL 727802, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2012).
246. In 2009, Poventud moved to stay his § 1983 action while he pursued a C.P.L.
§ 440.10 motion in New York state court seeking to invalidate his guilty plea as
involuntary. Although the district court granted the stay, Poventud later withdrew
his § 440 motion, resumed his § 1983 suit, and left his guilty plea unchallenged.
Poventud II, 715 F.3d 57, 57 (2d Cir. 2013), vacated en banc on other grounds, 750
F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2014).
247. Poventud I, 2012 WL 727802, at *1.
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prosecution’s failure to reveal evidence which [Poventud] alleges
would have supported his alibi defense” at trial, success on these
claims would “logically imply the invalidity” of his guilty plea because
Poventud pled guilty to conduct “which necessarily required his
presence at the scene of the crime.”248 Put simply, if the suppressed
misidentification evidence upon which Poventud based his claims
gave rise to damages, it must imply the invalidity of his guilty plea
because it is irreconcilable with Poventud being present at the scene
of the crime. Because of this inconsistency—denying his presence at
the scene of the crime at trial but then admitting to it in his plea—the
district court concluded that Poventud could not succeed on his claim
because he could not show that “the challenged conviction has been
reversed, expunged, invalidated, or called into question.”249 The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.250
C.

Poventud II—Exception to the Heck Bar Broadly Construed

Poventud appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.251 The
three-judge panel, comprised of then-Chief Judge Dennis Jacobs,
Judge Guido Calabresi, and Judge Robert Sack, divided over the
issue of whether Poventud’s release from custody constituted an
exception to Heck’s bar. Judge Calabresi, joined by Judge Sack,
wrote for the majority and held that “[u]nder the law of this Circuit, a
plaintiff asserting the unconstitutionality of his conviction or
incarceration must have access to a federal remedy . . . . As Poventud
is no longer in custody [and therefore cannot seek habeas relief],
Heck does not bar his claims under § 1983.”252
The panel decision explained that the Second Circuit had adopted
the limited view of Heck preferred by the concurring and dissenting
248. Id. at *3.
249. Id. Specifically, the district court concluded that:
Although Plaintiff’s initial conviction was vacated and a retrial granted,
Plaintiff was not exonerated of the charges on which he was originally
indicted and convicted. Instead, those charges were dismissed, prior to
retrial, because Plaintiff agreed to plead guilty to a related charge stemming
from the same events. Plaintiff therefore cannot show that his initial
conviction has been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or called into question
within the meaning of the Heck rule, and his subsequent guilty plea and
reconviction is fatal to his § 1983 claim.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
250. Id. at *4.
251. Poventud II, 715 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 2013), vacated en banc on other grounds, 750
F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2014).
252. Id. at 60.
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Justices in Spencer.253 The majority held that this circuit had
consistently reaffirmed the holdings in Jenkins and Leather that
“Heck’s favorable termination requirement applies only to plaintiffs
who are in custody.”254 Claimants with no remedy in habeas may
pursue their claims under § 1983.255 The court viewed Poventud’s
guilty plea as a possible defense to his claim for damages, but not a
bar to the action.256 Holding otherwise would have denied Poventud
any federal forum to seek redress for his alleged constitutional
violation. Thus, the court concluded that, because Poventud was no
longer in custody, the district court incorrectly barred his claim.257
Chief Judge Jacobs dissented, fervently rejecting both the
majority’s reliance on Supreme Court dicta and the majority’s
expansion of what he deemed already flawed post-Heck Second
Circuit case law.258 Judge Jacobs posited that pre-Heck Second
Circuit cases barred § 1983 claims that challenged the validity of
outstanding convictions and the Supreme Court’s holding in Heck
simply affirmed the Circuit’s position.259 Moreover, he argued that
the line of cases cited by the majority failed to effect a reversal of this
Circuit’s precedent.260
Even if it were appropriate to rely on the concurring and dissenting
Spencer opinions to limit Heck’s application, Judge Jacobs viewed the
majority’s holding as incongruous with any tenuous exceptions
discernible in the Circuit’s post-Heck jurisprudence.261 Jenkins,
Leather, Green, and Huang were all either distinguishable or
inapposite, and their holdings fell short of the broad and generalized
rule adopted by the majority.262 These cases merely expressed
support for Spencer’s narrow exception; they did not hold it

253. See supra Part I.B.
254. Poventud II, 715 F.3d at 61.
255. See id.
256. See id. at 61 n.2.
257. Id. at 62.
258. Id. at 66 (Jacobs, C.J., dissenting).
259. Id. at 67–68, 72. Judge Jacobs acknowledged Justice Souter’s attempt to
narrow the majority’s holding in Heck, but countered with the majority’s response,
which explicitly rejected Souter’s proposed limitation. See id. at 72 (citing Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 490 n.10 (1994)). Judge Jacobs was critical of the majority’s
discountenance of this proposition as both a footnote and dicta, because he believed
the majority relied on nothing more. See id.
260. See id. at 67–68 & n.4.
261. Id. at 69.
262. See id. at 70.
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absolute.263 Judge Jacobs remained resolute in his belief that Heck’s
bar remained in full force.264
With the majority’s holding, the Second Circuit had diverged from
both sides of the circuit split.265
D. Poventud III—Vacatur and Narrower Ground
Following the panel’s opinion, a majority of active judges on the
Second Circuit voted to rehear the case en banc to determine, inter
alia, the implications of custody (and access to habeas) as it interacts
with § 1983 claims that would otherwise imply the invalidity of an
outstanding conviction.266 In addition to the parties’ briefs, the court
drew amici from various criminal defense and state prosecutorial
organizations.267 On September 25, 2013, fifteen judges heard oral
argument.268 On January 16, 2014, nine judges upheld Poventud’s
right to sue under § 1983.269 Underscoring the extraordinary facts and
considerable legal questions presented, there were two concurring
opinions, one opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, and
two dissenting opinions.270 Judge Richard C. Wesley, writing for the
majority, found that Poventud’s § 1983 claim is not barred by Heck
because it does not necessarily imply the invalidity of his outstanding
conviction.271 Thus, the Court declined to reach the issue that so
sharply divided the original panel: whether a plaintiff challenging an
allegedly unconstitutional conviction or incarceration who is no

263. See id.
264. Poventud II, 715 F.3d at 70 (“I decline to argue over dicta distilled from
dicta—especially when the Supreme Court, ten sister Circuits, and numerous cases in
this Circuit counsel otherwise.”).
265. See id.; see also supra Part II.A–B.
266. Poventud III, 750 F.3d at 124 (2d Cir. 2014) (en banc).
267. See, e.g., Brief for District Attorneys Association of the State of New York as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellees, Poventud III, 750 F.3d 121 (2d
Cir. 2014) (No. 12-1011-CV), 2013 WL 4038709; Brief for Amici Curiae States of New
York, Connecticut, and Vermont in Support of Appellees, Poventud III, 750 F.3d 121
(2d Cir. 2014) (No. 12-1011-CV), 2013 WL 4038710.
268. See Mark Hamblett, Full Circuit to Hear Arguments on Ex-Inmate’s Right to
Sue, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 25, 2013, available at http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/
PubArticleFriendlyNY.jsp?id=1202620673996. In addition to the thirteen active
circuit judges, Senior Circuit Judges Calabresi and Sack were eligible to participate in
the en banc rehearing because they were members of the original three-judge panel.
See 28 U.S.C. § 46(c)(1) (2012).
269. Poventud III, 750 F.3d 121.
270. See Id. at 138 (Lynch, J., concurring); id. at 146 (Lohier, J., concurring); id. at
147 (Chin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 150 (Jacobs, J.,
dissenting); id. at 165 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
271. Id. at 127 (majority opinion).
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longer in custody, and therefore is ineligible for habeas, may pursue a
claim under § 1983.272

1.

The Majority Opinion

Although the majority upheld Poventud’s right to sue under § 1983,
it did so on a substantially narrower ground than the original panel.
Avoiding the question of whether custody alters a court’s Heck
analysis, the majority’s decision rested on the conclusion that
Poventud’s claims do not impugn his extant conviction by guilty
plea.273
Poventud had successfully challenged his 1998 trial
conviction.274 His § 1983 claims related only to the improper
procedures used in obtaining that conviction.275 Thus, concluded the
majority, Poventud’s subsequent guilty plea is “entirely independent”
of the alleged deficiencies at issue in his suit.276 Consequently, success
on those claims would not render invalid Poventud’s separate 2006
plea.277
Although the court’s decision vacated the prior panel opinion, it
did not address the issue that so fiercely divided those judges.
Indeed, the majority on several occasions reiterated that it declined to
reach the issue and expressed no views on the prior panel’s analysis or
conclusion.278 “As we note several times in this opinion,” wrote Judge
Wesley, “we decide this matter on the narrowest possible grounds
without passing any judgments on the views previously expressed by
either the members of the panel majority . . . or by the then lone
dissenter.”279

2.

Judge Jacobs’ Principal Dissent280

Judge Jacobs, writing for the dissent,281 argued that because
Poventud’s guilty plea conclusively placed him at the scene of the
crime with the intent to commit robbery, an award of damages for
civil claims that are grounded in Poventud’s professed innocence

272. Id. at 125 n.1.
273. Id. at 127.
274. See id. at 136.
275. See id.
276. See id.
277. See id.
278. See id. at 125 n.1, 127 n.7, 138 n.22.
279. Id. at 127 n.7.
280. Because Judge Livingston’s dissenting opinion focuses primarily on the
majority’s Brady analysis, this Article focuses on Judge Jacobs’ dissent.
281. Judges Cabranes, Raggi, Livingston, and Droney joined Judge Jacobs’ dissent.
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unquestionably implies the invalidity of that plea and thus plainly
invokes Heck.282 Finding that Poventud’s claim necessarily implies
the invalidity of his extant conviction, Judge Jacobs turned to the
issue that “launched th[e] rehearing en banc: whether the Heck bar
applies only to persons in custody, as the majority of the three-judge
panel held; whether there are any exceptions to the Heck bar; and
whether any exceptions that may exist would save Poventud’s
claim.”283 Judge Jacobs and his colleagues rejected the bright-line
custody-based holding of the original panel and argued that even if
exceptions to Heck do exist, a point the dissent in no way concedes,
Poventud’s suit does not fall within them.284
First, Judge Jacobs contended that even if Spencer’s proposed
exception to Heck was the law, it would not apply here. Poventud’s
ability to seek a favorable termination was not “impossible as a
matter of law.”285 In fact, Poventud had filed a collateral attack in
state court challenging the voluntariness of his guilty plea, but
withdrew it prior to an evidentiary hearing.286 Thus, because
Poventud remained able to refile his motion to vacate the plea,
compliance was not impossible as a matter of law.
Second, the dissent addressed the original panel’s interpretation of
Heck within the Second Circuit. The dissent perceived an implicit
rejection in the majority opinion of the original panel’s conclusion,
despite the majority taking pains to emphasize the en banc panel’s
neutrality.287 Jacobs contended that the majority’s acknowledgment—
that Poventud’s claims would be barred under DiBlasio v. City of
New York288 if they sounded in malicious prosecution—is
incompatible with the original panel’s decision because the Heck rule

282. Poventud III, 750 F.3d at 154 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
283. Id. at 163.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 163 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 21
(1998) (Souter, J., concurring)).
286. See id. at 164; see also Poventud I, No. 07 Civ. 3998, 2012 WL 727802, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2012).
287. See id. at 165; see also id. at 125 n.1, 127 n.7, 138 n.22.
288. 102 F.3d 654 (2d Cir. 1996). In DiBlasio, the plaintiff successfully secured a
writ of habeas corpus because of the prosecution’s alleged failure to produce or
identify a confidential informant. See id. at 655. On retrial, plaintiff was convicted of
a lesser offense. See id. The plaintiff thereafter filed a § 1983 claim alleging, inter
alia, malicious prosecution. See id. The district court dismissed the suit and the
Second Circuit affirmed. Because the plaintiff’s retrial ended in a conviction, the
proceedings had not terminated in plaintiff’s favor. See id. at 658. Accordingly,
because plaintiff could not show a favorable-termination, he likewise could not prove
all the elements of a malicious prosecution claim. See id. at 657.
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was not implicated in DiBlasio.289 Judge Jacobs additionally pointed
to a footnote in Poventud III, where the majority stressed that success
on Poventud’s § 1983 claim would do nothing to impeach the validity
of the 2006 conviction by guilty plea, because this consideration
“would be obviated but for the [otherwise applicable] bar of Heck.”290
In other words, the majority acknowledged that Poventud’s freedom
was irrelevant because, even though he was no longer in custody, the
majority conceded that Heck would bar claims relating to his
outstanding 2006 guilty plea.291 If the rule announced in the original
panel decision were correct, there would be no need to consider that
possibility.
Lower courts in the Second Circuit must now grapple with this
litany of distinctly divided opinions to ascertain how Heck’s favorable
termination requirement is to be applied going forward.
IV. THE POVENTUD II PANEL DECISION INCORRECTLY
EXPANDED THE LIMITED EXCEPTIONS PREVIOUSLY
RECOGNIZED BY THE SECOND CIRCUIT
This Part analyzes prior Second Circuit decisions interpreting the
limits of Heck and compares the reasoning in those cases with the
holding in Poventud II. First, this Part considers whether limiting
Heck’s bar only to claims brought by persons who are eligible for (or
were eligible for and failed to diligently pursue) habeas relief is
appropriate, given Heck’s core concerns. Next, it argues that the
holdings in Jenkins, Leather, and Green do not stand for the broad
proposition that, where habeas relief is unavailable to a former
prisoner, § 1983 relief must be also. Further, this Part argues that
Huang, while expanding on the narrow exceptions recognized in the
previous cases, nevertheless stopped short of the broader conclusion
reached in Poventud II, permitting § 1983 suits whenever habeas is
unavailable.
Next, this Part assesses whether Huang can be
reconciled with Heck and Spencer, and concludes that it can if
narrowly construed. Finally, this Part examines Poventud III to
determine whether it implicitly rejected Poventud II’s holding and
argues that although it remains unclear, courts in the Second Circuit
should read these cases as narrowly as possible, limiting the
exceptions to the facts presented in conformance with a majority of
other circuit courts.

289. Poventud III, 750 F.3d at 164.
290. Id. at 138 n.22, 164.
291. See id. at 136 n.19.
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A. These Narrow Interpretations Accord with Heck

Heck’s core concerns are not frustrated by the narrow exceptions
recognized in the majority of circuit courts. As an initial matter,
neither Heck nor Spencer was required to address whether the
favorable-termination requirement applies when a § 1983 plaintiff
cannot challenge an outstanding conviction through a habeas
petition.292 It is clear from Heck and, indeed, from all circuit courts,
that when § 1983 and habeas overlap, a prisoner must show a
favorable termination before a civil suit for damages can lie.293
However, there is less support for the extension of this principle to
cases where no such overlap exists.
Heck’s footnote ten is a source of controversy regarding the
breadth of Heck’s holding. Some courts have cited footnote ten to
support the proposition that Heck’s bar is absolute.294 Others have
rejected that assertion, determining footnote ten to be nothing more
than non-binding dicta.295 In footnote ten, Justice Scalia responded
directly to Justice Souter’s concern that the majority holding would
leave former prisoners without a remedy once they are released from
custody, stating, “[w]e think the principle barring collateral attacks—
a longstanding and deeply rooted feature of both the common law
and our own jurisprudence—is not rendered inapplicable by the
fortuity that a convicted criminal is no longer incarcerated.”296
Moreover, Justice Scalia prefaced his response by noting that “no
real-life example” of Justice Souter’s objections “comes to mind.”297
Footnote ten highlights two important reasons why the narrow
exceptions recognized in Part II.B are consonant with Heck’s holding
and why post-Heck Second Circuit cases can be appropriately
narrowed to accord with Supreme Court precedent.
Careful review of the plain text of Heck gives credence to the idea
that Heck only applies to former prisoners. Former prisoners, unlike
those who were never incarcerated, had access to habeas at some
point. Barring § 1983 claims by former prisoners eliminates the
incentive to end-run state habeas exhaustion requirements, a concern

292. See supra Part I.B.1–2.
293. See supra note 48 and accompanying text; see also supra Part II.
294. See, e.g., Entzi v. Redmann, 485 F.3d 998, 1003 (8th Cir. 2007); see also
Wilson v. Johnson, 535 F.3d 262, 262 (4th Cir. 2008) (Hanson, J., dissenting) (holding
that footnote ten “is part of the core holding of Heck”).
295. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19, 21, 26–27 (2d Cir. 1999); Dolney v.
Lahammer, 70 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1040–42 & n.1 (D.S.D. 1999).
296. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 490 n.10 (1994) (emphasis added).
297. See id.
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expressed by the Court in Heck.298 There is no risk of subversion,
however, when habeas was never possible. It is notable that most
circuits recognizing an exception for former prisoners have required a
good faith pursuit of habeas when applicable, in order to alleviate this
concern.299 Moreover, even permitting suits by plaintiffs who were
never or are no longer incarcerated does nothing to thwart “the hoary
principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for
challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments.”300 First, it
is axiomatic that a claimant who was never incarcerated cannot intend
to subvert habeas’ exhaustion requirements in order to seek release
through a § 1983 claim because release was never a concern; the
claimant seeks only damages. Second, a claimant who is no longer
incarcerated cannot seek to use a favorable civil judgment, even if it
implies the invalidity of an outstanding conviction, as an
impermissible, roundabout means of achieving release because there
is no release being sought.301 Roy Heck, however, could have used a
favorable civil judgment to “bolster a habeas claim for release,”302 and
the result in Heck flows logically from that fact.
Furthermore, the circuit split evidences numerous “real-life”
examples where applying Heck broadly foreclosed any form of
federal relief for constitutional violations, undercutting the thrust of
Justice Scalia’s argument.303 Thus, as multiple scholars have argued,
footnote ten should be recognized as dicta.304 This Article proceeds to

298. See Johnson v. Pottawotomie Tribal Police Dep’t, 411 F. App’x 195, 198 (10th
Cir. 2011) (“The purpose behind Heck is to prevent litigants from using a §
1983 action, with its more lenient pleading rules, to challenge their conviction or
sentence without complying with the more stringent exhaustion requirements for
habeas actions.” (quotations omitted)); Dyer v. Lee, 488 F.3d 876, 880 (11th Cir.
2007).
299. See supra Part II.B.
300. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486.
301. See Note, Defining the Reach of Heck v. Humphrey: Should the Favorable
Termination Rule Apply to Individuals who Lack Access to Habeas Corpus?, 121
HARV. L. REV. 868, 882 (2008).
302. See id. at 882; see also supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text.
303. See supra Part II.B. These examples include suits brought: (1) by the family
of a deceased prisoner who died while his habeas petition was pending; (2) by a
person who was never incarcerated, but successfully completed an Alternative
Rehabilitation Disposition program; and (3) by a person who diligently sought
habeas relief only to have his petition mooted upon his release.
304. See, e.g., Fein, supra note 71, at 25; Note, supra note 301, at 881–82 (“Given
that Heck did not require the Court to decide the question of whether an inmate
ineligible for habeas should be able to pursue a § 1983 claim, it is difficult to conclude
that Justice Scalia’s argument for the extension of the favorable termination
requirement to such claims ‘received the full and careful consideration of the
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examine post-Heck case law in the Second Circuit and proposes
interpretations accordant with this view.
B.

Jenkins, Leather, and Green Did not Create an Absolute
Right to File Suit Under Section 1983

Judge Calabresi’s decision principally relied on the Second
Circuit’s prior decisions in Jenkins, Leather, and Green to conclude
that “[o]ur Court has adopted Justice Souter’s dicta in Spencer.”305
This reliance, however, is unfounded. None of these cases stand for
the broad proposition that an ex-prisoner, for whom habeas is no
longer available, has an absolute right to seek damages under
§ 1983.306
Moreover, these cases presented facts materially
distinguishable from those in Poventud, and close examination of
their holdings reveals that exceptions to Heck’s bar are best confined
to these limited circumstances rather than universally applied.307
Jenkins concerned a challenge against intra-prison disciplinary
sanctions and the process by which those sanctions were
determined.308 The court permitted the suit to proceed because Heck
plainly was inapplicable to these facts. Jenkins’ suit sought damages
for “using the wrong procedures, not for reaching the wrong result,”309
a category of claims clearly deemed permissible in Heck. Indeed,
Heck only applies if the suit challenges the validity or length of
confinement, an element wholly missing from Jenkins’s allegations.
Success on Jenkins’s claims would have done nothing to invalidate the
conviction placing him in prison in the first place. Thus, the court
properly held Heck inapplicable.310 Jenkins is suitably analogized to
the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Harden because neither suit
implicated the plaintiff’s underlying guilt or innocence. They simply
challenged the extraneous processes by which subsequent treatment
was decided.311

[C]ourt.’”). But see Schneidau, supra note 58, at 659 & n.108 (2010) (citing cases that
held footnote ten as “part of the core holding of Heck by which [courts] are bound”).
305. Poventud II, 715 F.3d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 2013), vacated en banc on other grounds,
750 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2014).
306. See supra Part II.C; see also Teichmann v. New York, 769 F.3d 821, 827 & n.1
(2d Cir. 2014) (Livingston, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in
part).
307. See supra Part II.C.
308. See supra notes 189–98 and accompanying text.
309. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 482–83 (1994); see also supra notes 41–43
and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 202–04 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 121–22, 202–04 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, it is of no moment that the court pronounced that, even
if Jenkins’s suit did in fact impugn his underlying conviction, applying
Heck’s bar would be counter to the position taken by five current
Justices.312 The statement may be factually correct, but that alone
does not give it the force of law.313 First, as discussed in Parts II.A
and II.B above, it remains unsettled whether the Spencer
concurrences and dissent succeeded in limiting the sweeping bar of
Heck.314 Second, the statement in Jenkins was hardly necessary to the
court’s conclusion that the suit may proceed, a point conceded in the
opinion, and is thus properly categorized as dicta.315 It is not
characterized as an alternative holding, but purely a signal of
agreement with Spencer’s proposed constraint. Jenkins, therefore, is
best viewed as a straightforward application of, rather than an
exception to, Heck.316
The court’s decision in Leather appears on its face to directly
support the conclusion reached by Judge Calabresi in Poventud II.
However, there is a factor in Leather that should properly distinguish
its holding from the issue presented in Poventud. The plaintiff in
Leather was never incarcerated. This distinction is significant for two
reasons. As discussed above, the majority in Heck addressed directly
Justice Souter’s concern that prisoners no longer in custody would be
left without a remedy if Heck’s bar were applied so absolutely: “We
think the principle barring collateral attacks—a longstanding and
deeply rooted feature of both the common law and our own
jurisprudence—is not rendered inapplicable by the fortuity that a
convicted criminal is no longer incarcerated.”317 Interpreted literally,
this removes the facts of Leather from Heck’s purview under the
theory that Heck bars claims only by former prisoners.318 Former
prisoners, unlike those who were never imprisoned, had access to
habeas at some point.

312. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
313. See Note, supra note 301, at 881 (noting that dicta is “‘a statement not
addressed to the question before the court or necessary for its decision’”) (citing
Fein, supra note 71, at 13).
314. See supra Parts II.A and II.B.
315. See supra notes 203–04 and accompanying text.
316. Jenkins, like Heck, was in prison, but his claims had nothing to do with the
conviction that resulted in his incarceration.
317. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 490 n.10 (1994) (emphasis added); see also
supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text.
318. Of course, it must be recognized that regardless of whether a person was ever
incarcerated, the possibility of conflicting judgments concerning the validity of the
conviction may still arise. But, as discussed in Part IV.A above, the consequences of
such conflicting judgments are much more limited.
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This position is accordant with the holdings of a majority of the
circuits discussed in Part II.B where the courts barred actions under
Heck when former prisoners failed to avail themselves of accessible
remedies while they were incarcerated.319 These courts were not
opposed to exceptions under Heck, but only acknowledged them
when the claimant had made a good faith effort to pursue an available
remedy such as habeas, or when such an opportunity was never
possible for reasons outside the claimant’s control.320 Suits could
proceed where the plaintiff never had access to habeas, either because
they were never incarcerated or the period of incarceration was too
short for habeas to be practically available.321 Thus, one could
conclude that Leather supports the proposition that those who never
had access to habeas, as opposed to those who no longer have access,
may bring suit under § 1983.322
Reading Leather this way further limits concerns that it may run
afoul of Heck’s primary objective: to prevent a prisoner from
obtaining a civil judgment implying the invalidity of the conviction for
which he is currently incarcerated.323 True, conflicting judgments may
arise, but it is entirely possible to avoid a scenario where a prisoner
remains incarcerated despite a court judgment finding his conviction
illegal.324 This restrained conception of Leather is reconcilable with
those circuits that have found exceptions to Heck without creating an
easy means of vitiating Heck’s core concerns.325 Thus, Leather is

319. See supra Part II.B.
320. See supra Part II.B.
321. See supra Part II.B.
322. One could also argue that a suit alleging selective prosecution is an attack on
the procedure, not the resulting conviction. “A selective-prosecution claim is not a
defense on the merits to the criminal charge itself, but an independent assertion that
the prosecutor has brought the charge for reasons forbidden by the Constitution.”
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463 (1996). Some courts have rejected this
assertion. See, e.g., Schwartz v. N. M. Corr. Dep’t Prob. & Parole, 384 F. App’x 726,
730 (10th Cir. 2010) (“Thus, Mr. Schwartz’s claim would seem to be barred by Heck
as an improper challenge to his probation revocation under the guise of a § 1983
action.”); Omegbu v. Milwaukee Cnty., 326 F. App’x 940, 942–43 (7th Cir. 2009) (“A
decision here that Omegbu was selectively prosecuted would mean that his
conviction was unlawful; thus his equal-protection claim is barred under Heck.”).
However, it is conceivable that if the plaintiff were not to contest guilt and seek only
damages for the choice to prosecute him or her specifically, Heck would not apply.
See Heck, 512 U.S. at 482–83 (distinguishing between “a § 1983 claim for using the
wrong procedures” and one “for reaching the wrong result”).
323. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 484; see also Note, supra note 301, at 881.
324. See supra notes 298–300 and accompanying text.
325. See supra Part II.B.
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properly read to permit a § 1983 suit when the claimant was never in
custody.
Finally, Green is a tale of two decisions.326 In the first, the panel
certified questions to the New York Court of Appeals to determine if
collateral estoppel was appropriate under state law.327 Although the
district court had granted summary judgment against Green on that
basis, the defendants had alternatively argued on appeal that Green’s
claims were barred under Heck.328 In a footnote in that first opinion,
Judge Calabresi addressed that alternative contention, stating that
Leather permits § 1983 suits when the plaintiff cannot seek relief
through habeas.329 The panel stayed their final decision, pending the
response from the state court. The New York Court of Appeals
responded that collateral estoppel was applicable under New York
law, and the second opinion affirmed the district court’s judgment
solely on that basis.330 Like the statement in Jenkins, this statement
was wholly divorced from the court’s actual ruling.331 Remove it from
the court’s opinion and the outcome remains the same. There is no
doubt that these judges expressed a preference for this expansive
position, but neither Jenkins nor Leather nor Green rested on that
holding.
Accordingly, while all three cases express support for the holding
ultimately reached in Poventud II, not one of them materially relies
on that premise to reach its conclusion.332 Given the questionable
support for the original panel’s determination in the Heck and
Spencer decisions as well as those circuits finding exceptions, these
Second Circuit cases should not be read to stand for this expansive
proposition, but rather as recognizing limited exceptions particular to
the factual scenarios presented in each.

326. See Green v. Montgomery, 219 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2000), conforming to answer
to certified question in 245 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 2001).
327. See supra notes 211–15 and accompanying text.
328. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
329. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
330. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 214–15 and accompanying text.
332. See Teichmann v. New York, 769 F.3d 821, 827 & n.1 (2d Cir. 2014)
(Livingston, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in part).
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C. Even Though Huang Expands Upon the Limited Exceptions
in Jenkins, Leather, and Green, it Does not Permit Section 1983
Suits Whenever Habeas Relief Is Unavailable
Although this Article argues that the decision in Poventud II is
unsupported by the holdings in Jenkins, Leather, and Green, it
nevertheless concedes that Huang represents an undeniable
expansion of those limited holdings. Huang permitted a § 1983 suit to
proceed even though it clearly challenged the duration of
incarceration.333 Yet the court drew a distinction, recognizing that the
suit only challenged the duration and did not attack the validity of the
conviction.334 This perhaps intimates that if the suit were to challenge
the validity of the conviction, even though Huang’s son was no longer
incarcerated, Heck may have barred the suit.335 To borrow from
Judge Jacobs’ dissent, this distinction “would be obviated but for the
bar of Heck.”336 This caveat gives teeth to the idea that, despite the
court’s acknowledgment that five Justices in Spencer supported an
absolute right to a federal remedy, the Second Circuit was unwilling
to explicitly go that far absent a clearer indication from the Supreme
Court.
Indeed, some lower courts have construed Huang’s holding to be
more limited than it may appear on its face. In Browdy v. Karpe,337
the District Court for the District of Connecticut interpreted Huang
as permitting § 1983 suits so long as they only challenged the duration
and not the validity of an outstanding conviction.338 Thus, Huang’s
exception to Heck applied only in certain circumstances where habeas
was unavailable to address a constitutional wrong, unless the claims
by their nature attacked the validity of the conviction.339 Finding that
Browdy’s claim directly implicated the validity of his conviction, the
district court concluded that Huang was inapposite.340 If Huang stood
for an absolute remedy under § 1983, the claim could not have been

333. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
334. See Huang ex rel. Yu v. Johnson, 251 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 2001).
335. See id.
336. See supra notes 285, 287–88 and accompanying text.
337. No. 3:00 CV 1866, 2004 WL 2203464 (D. Conn. Sept. 20, 2004) (Droney, D.J.),
aff’d, 131 F. App’x 751 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Finally, even if [plaintiff] could clear these
significant hurdles, his . . . claims would be barred because they necessarily implicate
the validity of his conviction, which continues to have collateral consequences despite
the conclusion of the imposed term of incarceration.” (citing Huang, 251 F.3d at 73–
74.)).
338. See Browdy, 2004 WL 2203464, at *6.
339. See id.
340. See id. at *8.
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dismissed on that basis. It is true that Browdy brought his § 1983 suit
while still incarcerated and with a state habeas petition pending, but
these points further highlight why Huang’s holding must be read
narrowly. If courts permit post-custodial § 1983 suits to proceed
because habeas is no longer available, yet deny those same suits if
brought while the prisoner is still incarcerated, it would create the
perverse incentive to circumvent habeas’ strict state exhaustion
requirements by waiting until one’s prison term expires. This
untoward result conflicts with the Supreme Court’s rationale in
Heck.341 Nevertheless, other district courts in the Second Circuit have
applied a bright-line custody analysis to determine whether Heck bars
a particular action.342
Huang’s holding is an outlier among the six other circuit courts that
recognize some limited exception to Heck’s bar. At first glance, the
case closest to Huang is Wilson, in the Fourth Circuit.343 Though not
explicit, the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning appears to imply a “good
faith” or “practicality” requirement similar to the Sixth, Seventh,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits.344 The Court’s pronouncement that “[i]f a
prisoner could not, as a practical matter, seek habeas relief, and after
release, was prevented from filing a § 1983 claim,” suggests that the
exception is only warranted if some outside force, such as time, is the
reason that the conviction remains outstanding.345 And, indeed, the
Fourth Circuit more recently has limited Wilson’s holding to apply
only to situations where the § 1983 claimant was either never

341. See Jones, supra note 58, at 166 (“The Supreme Court’s rationale in Heck was
relatively straightforward: it would be improper for a prisoner to use a civil damages
action to circumvent the habeas statute’s strict requirements.”).
342. See, e.g., Hardy v. Fischer, 701 F. Supp. 2d 614, 620 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“The
Court recognizes that Heck’s favorable termination requirement does not bar
plaintiffs who are not in custody—and thus have no remedy through habeas relief—
from seeking relief pursuant to section 1983.”); Dallas v. Goldberg, No. 95 Civ. 9076,
2002 WL 1013291, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2002).
343. See supra Part II.B.4.
344. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
345. See supra note 170 and accompanying text; see also Bishop v. Cnty. of Macon,
484 F. App’x 753, 755 (4th Cir. 2012) (“Wilson does not permit a plaintiff to end-run
Heck by simply sitting on his rights until all avenues for challenging a conviction have
closed.”); Gilchrist v. Pinson, No. 5:11-01746, 2013 WL 3946278, at *5–6 (D.S.C. July
31, 2013) (“To hold that Wilson exempts Plaintiff from Heck’s holding would run
counter to the Fourth Circuit’s warning that Heck cannot be circumvented by a
plaintiff who fails to take advantage of all available rights. Thus, even though
Plaintiff is no longer a prisoner, the court finds that § 1983 suit, with respect to
Defendants’ actions in May 2009, is barred by Heck.” (citation omitted)).
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incarcerated or was incarcerated, but for a time insufficient to seek
habeas relief.346
Huang can and should be read to imply the same practicality
requirement. Yu, the juvenile son whose incarceration was at issue,
had roughly four months during which to challenge the extension of
his incarceration from late December 1997 to April 1998.347 This is an
equivalent time period to that in Wilson.348 Despite the court’s
reliance on the holding in Leather,349 as discussed above, Leather does
not support this broad proposition.350 The plaintiff in Leather was
fined, rather than incarcerated, making habeas an impossibility.351
The same can be said about Yu’s period of incarceration, which was
too short a time period to make habeas a practical option. Although
the court’s opinion posits a broad, sweeping rule, its incongruity with
all other circuit courts should lead the lower courts to discern a
narrower holding and look to the impossibility or impracticability of
habeas relief, rather than a simple, but more expansive, custody
versus no custody determination.
In light of the foregoing, Poventud II’s characterization of these
cases seems misleading and, in any event, resulted in an unwarranted
expansion of case law that should be limited to their facts. Jenkins
and Green were ultimately decided on other grounds.352 Leather was
not a “former prisoner,” thus materially distinguishing his claim from
those analyzed in Heck and Spencer.353 Huang, read broadly, is an
outlier among all circuit courts and can only accord with the more

346. See Bishop, 484 F. App’x at 755. Even under Bishop and Wilson, it remains
unclear whether the prisoner is still required to seek habeas relief while incarcerated,
as the plaintiff in Wilson did, even if it will eventually be deemed moot on his
forthcoming release.
347. See supra notes 216–19 and accompanying text. It is also noteworthy that
habeas relief is available to minors in state custody. See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467
U.S. 253 (1984).
348. See supra Part II.B.4.
349. See Huang ex rel. Yu v. Johnson, 251 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 2001) (“In light of
our holding in Leather, and in light of both the Spencer majority’s dictum and the
fact that the Spencer concurrences and dissent ‘revealed that five justices hold the
view that, where federal habeas corpus is not available to address constitutional
wrongs, § 1983 must be,’ we conclude that Huang’s Section 1983 claim must be
allowed to proceed.” (citations omitted)).
350. See supra notes 205–09 and accompanying text.
351. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 189–204, 211–15 and accompanying text; see also Teichmann
v. New York, 769 F.3d 821, 827 & n.1 (2d Cir. 2014) (Livingston, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment in part).
353. See supra notes 205–09 and accompanying text; see also Teichmann, 769 F.3d
at 827 & n.1.
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liberal interpretations of Heck and Spencer if restricted to its
“practicability of habeas” requirement. Lower courts should read
these cases narrowly, addressing the threshold Heck question only
when directly applicable, and should hold suits as barred unless the
plaintiff was either never in custody or was not in custody long
enough to make habeas a viable option.
D. Lower Courts Should Apply the Second Circuit’s Heck
Precedent Narrowly Going Forward
In Poventud III, the en banc Second Circuit vacated Poventud II
and allowed Marcos Poventud’s suit to proceed because his claim did
not imply the invalidity of his later (and still extant) guilty plea, not
because the court recognized an unrestricted right to a federal
remedy.354 With Poventud II’s holding vacated, either procedurally by
rehearing en banc or simply because the court reached its decision on
a narrower ground, the question remains whether such a broad right
exists within the Second Circuit.355 In other words, were an analogous
situation to present itself, can courts in the Second Circuit rely on
Poventud II’s rationale to permit a § 1983 claim that necessarily
implies the invalidity of an outstanding conviction if habeas is no
longer available?356 This Section argues that language in the majority
opinion cannot be deemed an explicit rejection of the result reached
in Poventud II, but advises lower courts that a narrow reading and
application of the Circuit’s prior Heck precedent is compatible with
Heck, Spencer, and the majority of circuit courts.
Judge Jacobs’s dissent in Poventud III submits that the majority
implicitly rejected Poventud II’s analysis and therefore holds that
Heck’s bar is not defeated simply by a prisoner’s release from
custody.357 First, Judge Jacobs protests that the majority’s concession
that Poventud’s claims would be barred under DiBlasio v. City of
354. See supra notes 264–77 and accompanying text.
355. Compare, e.g., Teichmann, 769 F.3d at 827 (Livingston, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment in part) (“I respectfully disagree with [Judge
Calabresi’s] characterization of our still-binding case law.”), with Teichmann, 769
F.3d at 830 (Calabresi, J., concurring) (explaining the Poventud III decision
“explicitly did nothing to disturb” the Second Circuit’s prior Heck holdings
(emphasis in original)).
356. An example of such a situation can be illustrated by altering the facts of
Poventud. Suppose Poventud failed to vacate his initial conviction and instead
served two more years in prison. Once released, he filed the same suit, alleging that
his trial rights were violated by his 1998 conviction. Even though the claims would be
procedurally-based Brady claims, Poventud could be successful only if the jury were
to find that he was wrongfully convicted.
357. Poventud III, 750 F.3d at 163 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
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New York358 if sounding in malicious prosecution cannot be
reconciled with the original Poventud II panel’s holding.359 But, as the
majority in Poventud III notes, favorable-termination is an element of
the tort of malicious prosecution.360 Thus, a suit alleging malicious
prosecution cannot succeed without a favorable termination of the
underlying conviction.361 The plaintiff’s custodial status never comes
into play unless a favorable termination is first shown. Therefore, the
majority’s statement can properly be characterized as a recognition
that failure as a matter of law to prove an element of an alleged
offense would bar Poventud’s suit, not as a rejection of the original
panel’s analysis.362
Nevertheless, Judge Jacobs cites the footnote wherein the majority
reiterates that it finds no reason to conclude that success on
Poventud’s claim would impugn his 2006 guilty plea conviction.363
Jacobs does so because, even though Poventud is now released, the
majority there is expressing concern about whether the claim would
impugn the 2006 conviction, a concern, Jacobs notes, “that would be
obviated but for the bar of Heck.”364
This point is well-taken, but hardly conclusive. As an initial
matter, even if the court were to hint that it was rejecting the
Poventud II analysis, such language would be dicta. The court’s
decision clearly rests on the finding that Poventud’s suit alleged a
procedurally-focused Brady claim that was independent from his later
guilty plea.365 In any event, the majority’s purposeful circumscription
of Poventud’s claims is not a definitive acknowledgment that Heck’s
bar remains in force. It may be because the court was trying to signal
that custody is not the critical concern in a Heck analysis. It may be
because a claim by Poventud regarding the 2006 conviction would
have sounded in malicious prosecution, the elements of which cannot
be met with the 2006 conviction remaining unchallenged. What does
seem clear, however, is that a majority of the active judges on the

358. 102 F.3d 654 (2d Cir. 1996). For a brief discussion of DiBlasio, see supra note
288.
359. Poventud III, 750 F.3d at 164 (Jacobs, J., dissenting); see also id. at 136
(majority opinion).
360. See id. at 136 (majority opinion).
361. See id. at 132.
362. Judge Jacobs also disagrees with the majority’s determination that Poventud’s
complaint does not sound in malicious prosecution. Poventud III, 750 F.3d at 155
(Jacobs, J., dissenting).
363. Poventud III, 750 F.3d at 162.
364. See id. at 164 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
365. See supra notes 276–77 and accompanying text.
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Second Circuit are unwilling to extend Heck precedent to the extent
Judges Calabresi and Sack did in Poventud II.366
In the last analysis, district courts should read the Second Circuit’s
Heck precedent as conforming with that of the Fourth, Sixth,
Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, where claims are permitted if the
plaintiff was never incarcerated or incarcerated for a period of time so
short as to render a habeas petition unavailable. The en banc vacatur
has given the Circuit, and the lower courts for that matter, an
opportunity to refine previously flawed case law and adopt a standard
more in line with a majority of other circuit courts. Jenkins, Leather,
Green, and Huang can all be read in a limited fashion that heeds the
concerns expressed by Justice Souter in his Heck and Spencer
concurrences while remaining within the bounds of Heck’s majority
holding.
CONCLUSION
Dicta in the Supreme Court’s decisions in Heck v. Humphrey and
Spencer v. Kemna has created a division amongst the circuit courts of
appeals as to whether Heck’s favorable-termination requirement
applies to non-habeas-eligible plaintiffs. Given the numerosity of
§ 1983 claims and habeas petitions filed each year,367 the stakes in this
area of the law are high. At present, the majority of circuits have
recognized limited exceptions where the plaintiff was either never in
custody or was in custody for such a brief period of time that any
attempt at habeas relief would have been futile. Until the Second
Circuit’s decision in Poventud II, no circuit had held Heck
inapplicable solely by virtue of the plaintiff’s custodial status.
This Article argues that the Second Circuit’s basis for reaching this
conclusion was premised on the erroneous reading of post-Heck
Second Circuit case law, but that these cases can be read in
accordance with Heck’s core concerns. This approach is consistent
with the “hoary principle”368 that § 1983 claims are inappropriate
substitutes for claims traditionally reserved for habeas, yet respectful
of Justice Souter’s concern that some would be without a federal
remedy for constitutional violations. Going forward, therefore, courts
in the Second Circuit should abandon Poventud II’s analysis and

366. See Teichmann v. New York, 769 F.3d 821, 830 (2d Cir. 2014) (Calabresi, J.,
concurring) (noting that the Heck analysis in the Poventud II panel decision “has
been forcefully attacked by a significant number of judges” on the Second Circuit).
367. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
368. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486 (1994).
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forgo application of Heck’s favorable-termination requirement when
the unavailability of habeas cannot be attributed to the plaintiff.

